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COMMENTS
Implications of the 1984 Insider Trading Sanction Act:
Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy*
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1984, President Reagan signed the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 (ITSA).1 ITSA provides the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) with a treble civil penalty2 enforcement sanction to use against
corporate insiders who trade securities in violation of rule lOb-5 3-a rule pre-
scribed by the SEC in accordance with section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act (Exchange Act).4 The treble penalty supplements existing SEC sanctions s
* The author would like to thank Professor Thomas Lee Hazen for his assistance in the
development of this Comment.
1. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (West Supp. 1985)). ITSA became effective
upon enactment, August 10, 1984. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West Supp. 1985).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). "[The] court shall have jurisdiction to im-
pose. . . a civil penalty.. . [that] shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a
result of such unlawful purchase or sale .. " Id. ITSA also increases the criminal penalty for all
violations of the Securities Exchange Act from $10,000 to $100,000, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West Supp.
1985) (amending § 32 of the Exchange Act, ch. 404, 73 Stat. 904 (1934)), to adjust for inflationary
erosion of the fine's deterrent effect.
3. A rule 10b-5 violation occurs when a corporate insider "trad[es] in securities based on
nonpublic confidential or proprietary information." T. HAzEN, THE LAW oF SEcuarriEs REGULA-
TION 480 (Law. ed. 1985); see infra notes 12-19, and accompanying text (defining inside information
and inside trading).
4. Rule lob-5 allows the SEC to bring enforcement actions under the Exchange Act against
insiders who fraudulently exploit inside information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
Establishing a lOb-S violation is a prerequisite to the assessment of the treble penalty. The
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and is designed to deter insider trading,6 thereby protecting investor confidence
and the integrity of the securities market.7 Although ITSA bolsters the SEC
enforcement sanctions, it does not alter the underlying substantive law of insider
trading; accordingly, the courts, not ITSA, define what conduct constitutes a
lOb-5 violation.8
This Comment identifies and assesses two problematic consequences of
ITSA. ITSA adds significant factors to a trial judge's decision whether to allow
the use of offensive nomutual collateral estoppel by a plaintiff in a private ac-
tion following a successful SEC treble penalty action.9 This Comment reviews
these factors, concluding that collateral estoppel should be available to a private
plaintiff following an SEC treble penalty action. Another consequence of ITSA
is the possibility of placing a violator in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
After a review of double jeopardy doctrine, the Comment concludes that the
combination of a criminal prosecution and an SEC treble penalty action would
compel an insider to defend two "essentially criminal" 10 lawsuits for the "same
offense,"'1 1 thereby violating the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, 74, 107-08
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
5. ITSA amends § 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 73 Stat. 886. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u (West Supp. 1985). Section 2(A) of ITSA provides that an action seeking the treble
penalty "may be brought in addition to any other actions that the Commission or the Attorney
General are entitled to bring." 15 U.S.C.A. 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). The legislative history
corroborates the need for a treble penalty. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 5, 10, 72, 116; Insider
Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H. 559 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, 26-27, 56, 60 (1983) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; H.
REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 16, 20 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; 130 CoNe.
REc. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
6. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 2, 3; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 12, 16, 59; H.R.
REP., supra note 5, at 8, 18, 24; 130 CONG. REc. S8914 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes); 129 CONG. REc. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
7. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1, 11, 95, 115, 147; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 16,
35, 36; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 23; 130 CONG. REc. S8914 (daily ed. July 29, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Sarbanes); 130 CONG. REc. H7757, 7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statements of Rep. Dingell
and Rep. Wirth); 129 CONG. REc. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
8. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 72, 74, 95; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9, 13 n.20, 14, 31,
32; 130 CONG. Rc. H7758, (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell); see 130 CONG.
REC. S8912-13 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (expressing desirability of
statutory definition of insider trading but noting that such definition not included in ITSA).
9. For information on collateral estoppel, see generally C. WIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COuNTs 682-88 (1983) (description and explanation of collateral estoppel).
10. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Law of Insider Trading12
ITSA is applicable only when a lOb-51 3 insider trading violation can be
established. There are two essential elements of a 10b-5 violation: a fiduciary
relationship between the defendant and the parties with whom the defendant
transacts and fraudulent conduct by the defendant.'
4
A fiduciary duty arises from the relationships between corporate insiders-
directors, officers, and other persons within the corporation who have access to
confidential corporate information-and shareholders of the corporation. 15
This fiduciary duty requires insiders either to disclose nonpublic, confidential
information relevant to a decision to buy or sell or to abstain from trading in the
company's stock. This requirement is known as the duty to "disclose or ab-
stain."16 Fraudulent conduct is a breach of the corporate insider's fiduciary
duty. The purchase or sale of securities by anyone knowingly in possession of
material, 17  nonpublic information-"inside" information-is fraudulent.' 8
Fraudulent conduct also may arise outside the purchase or sale context if an
insider tips material, nonpublic information to another trader.'
9
12. For commentary on insider trading, see Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and
Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307 (1981); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Conant, Duties of
Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); Dooley,
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980); Fleischer, Mundheim &
Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 798 (1973); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1982); Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the
Common Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 845 (1982).
13. See supra note 4. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to an express authori-
zation in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. As a result, rule l0b-5 has the force of a statutory provision.
T. HAzEN, supra note 3, at 12 & n.3.
In addition to lOb-5, there are other statutory provisions prohibiting insider trading. Section
17(a) of The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1982), contains substantially the same
language as rule lOb-5 and applies to the primary distribution of securities. Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act, id. § 78p(b), proscribes "unfair use of information" by insiders. It allows the issuer
to recover any profits made by an insider "from any purchase and sale or any sale and purchase,...
within any period of less than six months." Id. Finally, rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1984),
created pursuant to an express authorization in § 14e of the Exchange Act, prohibits fraudulent use
of inside information in the context of tender offers and has the force of a statutory provision. See T.
HAZEN, supra note 3, at 362.
14. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231
(1980); Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 75-76; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 113.
15. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984); Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 75; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 16-17. The fiduciary
duty extends not only to shareholders from whom the insider is buying, but also to potential share-
holders to whom the insider is selling. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980);
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
16. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229-31 (1980). See Hazen, supra note 12, at 850.
17. The materiality requirement necessitates that the inside information be a factor in the in-
vestment decision. In re Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971); Senate Hearings, supra note
4, at 110-11, 116.
18. Rule lob-5 expressly requires that the fraudulent conduct be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984); supra note 4. Scienter also is an
element of a rule lob-5 violation. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
19. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (The SEC determined that a tip of inside
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A company president who buys stock from shareholders of the company or
on the open market without disclosing that the company has made a major min-
eral find has violated lOb-5.2 0 The result is the same when a broker-dealer sells
stock on the basis of information obtained from an insider.2 1 In both instances,
the president's conduct constitutes fraud and a breach of the duty to disclose or
abstain. In contrast, a printer who, while working on galleys, obtains material,
nonpublic information about an impending tender offer and purchases stock in
the target company probably has not violated lOb-5. 22 Similarly, a stock analyst
who, possessing material, nonpublic information that an insurance company is
engaging in fraud, passes this information to a number of investors probably has
not violated lOb-5. 23 Both the printer and stock analyst are outsiders and owe
no duty to disclose or abstain to the corporation's shareholders.
24
information from an insider to a broker-dealer who passed the information on to his clients "at least
violated [rule lOb-5(3)] as a practice which operated as fraud or deceit upon the purchasers [of the
securities sold by the tippees]."). Id. at 913; Hazen, supra note 12, at 848. Examples of fraudulent
conduct covered by 10b-5 include the sale or purchase of stock in a face-to-face transaction or on the
open market without disclosing nonpublic information that the company will increase in value be-
cause of a merger, tender offer, mineral find, or any other fact that a reasonable investor would
weigh in making an investment decision. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849-52 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Passing on nonpublic information about an impending
dividend reduction in a publicly traded stock is another example of fraudulent conduct. Cady, Rob-
erts, 40 S.E.C. at 907.
20. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 476
(1969).
21. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
22. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983). Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 75-76. See Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 404 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
24. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 404 S. Ct.
1280 (1984); Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 76-78. The SEC, however, has advanced alternative
theories under which it can bring actions against outsiders who trade with, or tip material, nonpublic
information. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 76-78. Creation of these theories is an attempt to
circumvent the Supreme Court's requirement of a fiduciary obligation as a prerequisite to a lob-5
violation. Id. One theory purports to treat outsiders as insiders, thereby justifying the imposition of
the lob-5 duty. See eg., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (bank employ-
ees owed duty of disclosure to Ute Indians when employees were purchasing shares in a tribal trust
fund without disclosing the existence of another market in which the shares could be sold for a
higher price); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (investment advisor
owed clients duty of disclosure when he purchased stock for his own account immediately prior to
publishing a recommendation that his clients buy the stock); see also Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594
F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979) (financial columnist committed lOb-5 violation by purchasing a security
prior to publishing a buy recommendation); Lewelling v. First California Co., 564 F.2d 1277 (9th
Cir. 1977) (brokerage firm committed lob-5 violation by failing to disclose to purchaser that the
transactions were part of a scheme to resell insiders' securities to enable such insiders to bail out of
failing corporation). The Supreme Court has been willing to impose a lOb-5 duty on outsiders who
have a special relationship of trust and confidentiality with the seller or issuer of the securities. See,
eg., Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983); Moss, 719 F.2d at 11.
A second theory, called the misappropriation theory, extends the scope of lOb-5 to outsiders
based on an outsider's breach of a duty owed an employer in procuring the information. Some lower
federal courts have accepted the misappropriation theory. See, eg., United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Commentators advocating a statutory definition of "insider trading" have contended that the misap-
propriation theory has a tenuous future and may not suffice to put outsiders within the scope of lOb-
5. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 76-78; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 114-17. Under a strict
reading of Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit recently rejected the misappropriation theory as a basis for an outsider's duty of
disclosure to open market investors. Moss, 719 F.2d at 13, 15, 16. Under the misappropriation
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B. Pre-ITSA Enforcement Remedies
Prior to the enactment of ITSA, the SEC's arsenal of enforcement sanctions
did not include a civil penalty.25 The primary sanction had been an injunction
against future violations of the security laws and disgorgement of illicit profits.
26
An injunction is appropriate when the "defendant's past conduct indicates...
that there is a reasonable likelihood of further violation in the future." 27 A
defendant who violates the terms of an injunction may be subject to criminal
fines and imprisonment.28 Disgorgement, in contrast to the payment of dam-
ages, is not designed to compensate an injured party; instead, it is intended to
force "a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched." 29
The disgorged profits are placed in an escrow account and distributed to private
parties who can demonstrate losses incident to the defendant's illegal trading.
30
Other SEC equitable enforcement sanctions have included requiring the defend-
ant to disclose previously withheld or omitted information, correct misleading
reports, or add independent directors to corporate boards.3 1 These pre-ITSA
theory, a printer who surreptitiously deciphers confidential information about an impending tender
offer and subsequently purchases stock in the target company has violated lOb-5 by fraudulent con-
duct in breach of a duty owed his or her employer. The defendant in Chiarella would have been in
violation of 1Ob-5 had the misappropriation theory been applied. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239, 240
(comments of Justices Brennan and Burger in support of the misappropriation theory); House Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 114. It is not necessary to show the breach of a fiduciary duty owed the
shareholders. Although the Supreme Court has not decided on the viability of the misappropriation
theory, the Court has placed a proviso on the theory, requiring that an outsider who tips the confi-
dential information receive a direct or indirect benefit as a precondition of a lOb-5 violation. Dirks,
103 S. Ct. at 3264; T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 489.
25. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 13-14 (list of pre-ITSA sanctions that have been
issued).
26. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 95; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 12; H.R. REP., supra
note 5, at 7, 24; 130 CONG. REc. H7759 (daily ed., July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
27. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. See., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,99 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting 3 L. Loss,
SEcuRITIS REGULATIONS 1976 (1961)). See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d
Cir.1977); SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
834 (1978); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 394 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 7.
29. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978). Disgorgement is
viewed as an equitable remedy, justifying denial of a jury trial right in an SEC disgorgement action.
"rTlhe court is not awarding damages to which plaintiff is legally entitled but is exercising the chan-
cellor's discretion to prevent unjust enrichment." Id. at 95.
30. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 25. See Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A
Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MiNN. L. Rnv. 865, 932 n.302 (1983); Hazen, Administrative En-
forcement An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of Injunctions and Other
Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 427, 446 (1979). See also SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1978) ("SEC makes proceeds of disgorgement available to injured
investors.").
31. In addition to its equitable sanctions, the SEC has the authority to commence an adminis-
trative proceeding pursuant to rules 15b-4 and 15c-4 against a broker-dealer or any person subject
to the reporting requirements of §§ 12, 13, and 15(b) of the Exchange Act. The term "dealer"
includes "any person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as agent,
broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in
securities issued by another person." 15 U.S.C. § 776(12) (1982). Persons violating the reporting
requirements have been ordered by the SEC to make more complete disclosures and to comply in the
future. Other sanctions against broker-dealers have included "censure, limitations on activities, and
suspension or revocation of the registration of a broker-dealer or person associated with a broker-
dealer." H.R. REP, supra note 5, at 7. These administrative SEC orders, however, do not have the
1985]
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sanctions are still in effect and can be used by the SEC in conjunction with ITSA
enforcement provisions.
In addition to government enforcement sanctions, a defendant who violates
lOb-5 also may be subject to suit by a private plaintiff for damages. 32 To estab-
lish a private action against a defendant for inside trading, a private plaintiff
must prove that the defendant violated lOb-5 and must show reliance, causation,
and damages. 33 The SEC's enforcement remedies, in contrast, are available
against inside traders merely upon a showing that the defendant violated lOb-5.
To avoid exposing an insider to excessively burdensome liability, the courts have
placed restrictions on the class of private plaintiffs to whom the insider may be
liable and on the type of damages allowed. 34 To recover, the private plaintiff
must be a member of the class of persons to whom the defendant owes a fiduci-
ary duty.35
Private actions pursuant to lOb-5 have been successful when controlling
shareholders, directors, or officers possessing material, nonpublic information
enter into face-to-face transactions with existing shareholders. 36 This conduct
by corporate insiders not only violates lOb-5, it also imposes on the insider a
duty to disclose, the breach of which provides the basis for a private action
brought by the shareholder trading with the insider.3 7 Insiders trading on the
open market, however, are less susceptible to private actions. 38 Even though
insiders trading on the open market are vulnerable to SEC l0b-5 enforcement
actions, courts have hesitated to extend an insider's duty to disclose or abstain
beyond face-to-face transactions because such an extension could expose insiders
to overly burdensome liability.39 Courts that deny liability also point to the
difficulty in determining which investors on the open market actually were in-
same enforcement effect as injunctions, because a defendant who disregards an order is not subject to
a criminal contempt proceeding. Id. Defendants engaging in willful violations of the Exchange Act
have also been subject to fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment in criminal actions brought by the
Justice Department. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
32. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 118-20; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognized implied private actions pursuant to lOb-5). Later, the Supreme Court
expressly allowed private actions pursuant to lOb-5. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Mill v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Hazen, Symposium Introduction: The Supreme Court
and the Securities Laws." Has the Pendulum Slowed? 30 EMORY L..5, 11-17 (1981); Hazen, Impled
Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither A Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights,
Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333, 1340-42 (1980).
33. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 325 n.2 (1979); SEC v. Management
Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972); Hazen, supra note 30, at 456; Pickholz & Brodsky, An
Assessment of Collateral Estoppel and SEC Enforcement Proceedings After Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 37, 50 (1978).
34. See, eg., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977) (Trading by insiders on the open market ordinarily does not cause any legally recogniza-
ble loss to plaintiffs trading on the open market who would have traded in any event.).
35. See Hazen, supra note 12, at 852. In a face-to-face securities transaction, an insider owes a
duty of disclosure to the party with whom he or she trades. Id.
36. See, eg., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
37. See Hazen, supra note 12, at 852.
38. Id. at 852-53.
39. Id.; see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir 1976).
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jured by the inside purchases or sales.4°
C. The Need for Potent Sanctions
Congress is concerned about the effects of insider trading for several rea-
sons. First, insider trading undermines investor confidence. "Capital formation
and our nation's economic growth and stability depend on investor confidence in
the fairness and integrity of our capital market."'4 1 Second, insider trading in-
jures specific people: "[M]arket makers and specialists, so necessary to the li-
quidity of the market, have suffered extreme financial losses ... ."42 Although
lOb-5 transgressors have been subject to injunctions, disgorgement, criminal
fines, imprisonment, civil suits by defrauded parties, disbarment, license revoca-
tion, loss of employment, payment of legal fees, and social opprobrium,4 3 these
sanctions did "not serve as a real deterrent when compared to the vast profits
which can be gained so rapidly by trading with inside information." 44 Accord-
ing to Congress, ITSA's substantial sanctions were needed to deter insider trad-
ing, thereby effectuating the policy goals of protecting investor confidence and
preventing injury to market professionals. 45
Pre-ITSA sanctions alone are an inadequate deterrent for a number of rea-
sons. First, the difficulty in meeting the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in cases almost exclusively based on circumstantial evidence renders the
criminal law penalties ineffective.4 6 Second, the real enforcement power behind
40. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 118. Presently, the courts are split on whether a private
action exists when an insider defendant trades at an informational advantage on the open market.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has determined that such an action "does
not ordinarily cause any loss to open market traders who would have traded in any event." Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976). Allowing damages in such cases would create "a
windfall for those fortuitous enough to be aware of their nebulous legal rights, and [impose] what
essentially must be considered punitive damages almost unlimited in their potential scope." Id. at
321. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reached the opposite result,
concluding that a private action exists "in favor of all investors who traded in the market contempo-
raneously with the insider trader before the information was disclosed." Elkind v. Ligget & Myers,
Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165-68 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974); House Hearings, supra note 5, at 119. A plaintiff need only demon-
strate that "the market price was affected by the misstatement or omission and the plaintiff's injury
is due to a purchase or sale at the then fraudulently induced market price"--the fraud on the market
approach. T. HAzEN, supra note 3, at 465. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit resolved the problem of potentially burdensome liability by limiting a defendant's liability to
disgorgement of profits. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 173; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 118-20.
41. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 2.
42. Id. at 5.
43. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 13-14.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. at 35-37 (statements of Rep. Wirth and John Fedders, director of SEC enforcement).
46. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 39-40 (testimony of John Fedders, director of SEC en-
forcement) ("Now when you go into the criminal forum you meet the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and to take circumstantial evidence and meet that burden is difficult for criminal
prosecution. That's why I think... the civil penalty is correct. We know that it is going to con-
tinue to be the circumstantial evidence that we act on. We're going to meet the preponderance of
evidence test."); House Hearings, supra note 5, at 63. See also H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 30-31
("Most insider trading cases are. . . based largely on circumstantial evidence."); Hazen, supra note
30, at 435 (Because of the "constitutional and procedural safeguards that accompany criminal tri-
als," criminal prosecutions are seldom pursued.).
To successfully prosecute an insider, the Justice Department must prove beyond a reasonable
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an injunction rests in a possible criminal contempt proceeding, which is avail-
able only if the defendant repeats the illegal conduct.47 An injunction, therefore,
will deter repeat violations because a previously enjoined defendant faces the
risk of a criminal contempt proceeding for subsequent violations. An injunction,
however, does not penalize a defendant for the immediate, illegal conduct and
thus provides only an inconsequential deterrent against initial violations.48
Third, disgorgement merely returns a defendant to his or her financial position
prior to the illegal trading.49 By failing to threaten potential violators with sig-
nificant negative consequences, disgorgement is an insufficient deterrent.50
Fourth, changes in the securities market have multiplied the opportunities for an
investor with inside information to make huge profits on a minimal invest-
ment.51 The increase in mergers and tender offers, as well as the growth of the
options market, has "fundamentally altered the risk-reward equation with re-
spect to potential insider trading."' 52 Tender offers and mergers frequently result
in quick, sweeping price movements in the target company's stock, creating a
strong temptation for persons possessing inside information to purchase stock in
the target company. Persons with inside information of an impending tender
offer, for example, may be tempted by the options market, where a small invest-
ment in options in the target company's stock can yield significant profits when
the information becomes public and the underlying stock increases in value. Be-
cause of these market conditions, pre-ITSA sanctions were inadequate to offset
doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully violated lOb-5. 15 U.S.C. § 78 ff(a), (c)(1) (1982).
See Hazen, supra note 30, at 435. As a result, "criminal proceedings utilize far more governmental
resources." Id. at 432. Before a criminal action is commenced, the SEC refers the case to the
Attorney General. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 41-42 (letter to members of Senate Sub-
committee on Securities from Director of SEC indicating that SEC investigations result in either
informal reports or formal referrals to the Department of Justice or a grant of access for the Depart-
ment of Justice to SEC files). Ultimately, the Justice Department and the SEC work together to
prepare the criminal case. Hazen, supra note 30, at 435.
As of June 1, 1984, the SEC had instituted 61 civil actions against insiders for lob-5 violations
since 1981. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 41. The SEC formally referred seven cases to the
Justice Department and granted access to SEC files in nineteen other cases. Id. Twenty-two crimi-
nal actions ultimately were brought, with seventeen resulting in criminal penalties, five of which
were prison sentences. Id. at 42. For a synopsis of each criminal action, see id. at 42-51. For other
comments concerning criminal prosecution of insiders who violate lOb-5, see Senate Hearing, supra
note 4, at 39, 112; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 60-71; 130 CONG. RIc. H7757 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell that criminal charges are rare); Hazen, supra note 30, at 434-35.
47. H.RL REP., supra note 5, at 7. An injunction "serves only a remedial function.... ." Id.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 32; Dent, supra note 30, at 930; Hazen, supra note 30, at 444;
Comment, Scienter and SEC Injunction Suits, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1018, 1023-24 (1977); Note, SEC
Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Scienter Question, 5
HoFsrA L. REv. 831, 833-35 (1977).
48. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 95; H.RL REP., supra note 5, at 7.
49. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978); House Hearings,
supra note 5, at 12; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 7. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,
400-02 (1946); 5 J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 38.24[2] (1977).
50. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 12; H.R. REp., supra note 5, at 7.
51. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 17; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 18-20; H.R. REP.,
supra note 5, at 5, 6, 21; 130 CONG. REc. H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth);
129 CONG. REc. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
52. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 20.
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the increased temptation to violate the securities laws.53 Finally, the risk to a
violator of detection is slight 5 4 When coupled with insubstantial sanctions, a
low rate of detection exacerbates the deterrence problem.
Beyond its desire to bolster deterrence, Congress sought harsher sanctions
to punish insiders who violate lOb-5 as a matter of principle. ITSA's legislative
history is embellished with references to such insiders as "thieves." 55 John
Shad, Chairman of the SEC, promised to come down on them with "hobnail
boots."'5 6 The pre-ITSA sanctions, in Congress' view, were not commensurate
with the magnitude of the wrong committed.57
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE INSIDER TRADING lRoBLEM
Congress enacted ITSA to effectuate the policy goals of protecting investor
confidence, preventing injury to market professionals, and preserving the effi-
ciency and integrity of the securities market. ITSA augments the "risk-reward
equation"58 and makes the penalties for insider trading more commensurate
with the magnitude of the temptation and potential profit, thereby restraining
would-be transgressors with the threat of substantial, even financially crippling,
fines.
Although ITSA provides additional enforcement sanctions, it does not de-
fine "insider trading," 59 leaving the courts to determine the scope of lOb-5.
53. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 40; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2, 31; 130 CONG.
REc. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
54. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 39, 40.
55. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1, 39; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1, 65; 130 CONG.
REc. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell); id. at S8912 (daily ed. June 29,
1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
56. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2.
57. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 39, 40, 147; see House Hearings, supra note 5, at 70; 130
CONG. REC. H7757, H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statements of Rep. Dingell and Rep. Wirth).
Representative Dingell commented that insiders who violate 10b-5 "are thieves and the current law
is the equivalent of making a bank robber return the loot and then proceed on his merry way after
signing a promise not to steal anymore-without having to admit he stole in the first place." Id. at
H7757. Representative Wirth asserted that pre-ITSA sanctions "merely [restore] an unscrupulous
trader to his original position without extracting a real penalty for his illegal behavior." Id. at
H7759. Representative Bates sought "much tougher criminal sanctions. We have been toughening
up [penalties for] burglaries and robberies, and armed robbery .... Drunk driving is starting to
get some attention, and yet the white collar crimes, we are just getting around to . House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 70.
58. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 21.
59. See supra note 8. Although the vast majority of commentators, members of Congress, and
SEC staff members were in favor of supplementing the SEC enforcement sanctions with the treble
penalty, a substantial debate transpired over whether the treble penalty alone, without an expanded
definition of "insider trading," would be effective. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 32-33, 38, 66,
67-86, 99, 106-07, 116, 147; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 14-15, 49-56, 89-90, 98-99, 106-07, 112,
144-45, 174-98, 234-35. Many members of Congress and several commentators argued for an ex-
panded definition of "insider trading." Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1-2, 66, 67-86, 96, 146;
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 52, 106, 112, 144, 174-98. Proponents of this view envisioned a
definition that would remove the fiduciary duty requirement from the case law definition of "insider
trading," allowing 10b-5 to reach outsiders who base their trading on, or tip material, nonpublic
information. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1-2, 8-10, 68-86, 147; House Hearings, supra note 5,
at 174-96. The Senate hearings incorporated an alternative draft of ITSA, developed by Milton
Freeman and presented by Senator D'Amato, which expressly disallowed "unfair trading." Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 8-10. Supporters of the draft argued that the fraud requirement of a 10b-5
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ITSA amends section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give the SEC
the authority to seek a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profit
gained or loss avoided by one "purchasing or selling a security while in posses-
sion of material information." 6° At its discretion, the SEC may seek an injunc-
tion, disgorgement, the treble penalty, or any combination of these sanctions.6 1
Furthermore, the SEC has the authority to seek the treble penalty from any or
all persons within the scope of the Act.62 Thus, the payment of a treble penalty
by one person does not extinguish the liability of another person. 63 To establish
an insider's liability, the SEC need only meet the burden of proof applicable in
SEC injunction actions and private civil suits-a preponderance of the
evidence.64
In addition to bolstering SEC enforcement ability, ITSA increases from
$10,000 to $100,000 the maximum criminal fine for all violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.65 Because the civil penalties and the criminal punishments
violation prevents SEC enforcement against outsiders who make transactions based on nonpublic
information. Id. at 2, 68-86, 95, 147; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 174-96. These traders have
information unavailable to the public, giving them an unfair advantage over even diligent investors.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 68-86; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 174-96. "Unfair trnd-
ing" of this nature erodes investor confidence and was viewed as reprehensible. See Senate Hearings,
supra note 4, at 32-33, 68-86, 147; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 174-96. For these reasons, an
expanded definition of "insider trading" was viewed as essential to effecting ITSA's policy goals.
The SEC staff and a number of commentators were opposed to including a statutory definition
of insider trading. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 38, 107; see House Hearings, supra note 5, at 98-
99. Their main objection was that the inclusion of such a definition would delay passage of ITSA.
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 36-38; see 130 CONG. RIc. S8912-13 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)
(statement of Sen. D'Amato). The SEC maintained that the misappropriation theory would become
accepted law, resulting in the proscription of at least some types of unfair trading over which Senator
D'Amato expressed concern. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 33; see supra note 24 (misappropria-
tion theory explained). Ultimately, Senator D'Amato acquiesced and came out in favor of ITSA,
believing that immediate passage of ITSA was more important than the inclusion of the definition.
130 CONG. REc. S8411, S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
Advocates of a statutory definition could point to studies of deterrence in the criminal context
which indicate that certainty of conviction (high rates of detection and prosecution) provides more
deterrence than increased penalties. See F. McCuiNTOcK & E. GIBSON, ROBBERY IN LONDON 30
(1961); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY REPORT, THE DETERRENT EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF CammNAL SANCrION STRATEGIES 18, 34 (Sept. 1972); F. ZIMNG & G. HAWKIN,
DEmuENcE 3 (1973). If this principle were applicable to insider trading, then a statute which
includes "unfair trading" in the category of prohibited trading would increase the SEC's rate of
successful enforcement actions and would provide both a strong deterrent and an excellent comple-
ment to the existing treble penalty.
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). To satisfy a judgment for a treble penalty,
the defendant pays the specified amount to the United States Treasury. Id.
61. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 27; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 8; 130 CONG. Rc. S8913
(daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 14, 50.
62. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 14; 130 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Dingell). There were comments, however, that the combined amount of the
penalty could be "astronomical." Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 146.
63. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 14; 130 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Dingell).
64. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9, 15, 16, 27, 30, 31. Given the punitive nature of the treble
penalty, it was pointed out that "a clear and convincing" standard might be more appropriate. Sen-
ate Hearings, supra note 4, at 109, 111-13; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 205. The SEC, however,
contended that because actions brought against insiders who violate lOb-5 are based on circumstan-
tial evidence, a higher standard of proof would impede the SEC's ability to bring successful treble
penalty actions, undermining the deterrent effect of ITSA. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46.
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West Supp. 1985) (amending § 32(a) of the Exchange Act). The crimi-
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are not mutually exclusive,66 the harshest repercussion of insider trading would
be a triple action attack: an SEC injunction, disgorgement, and treble penalty
action; a criminal action seeking a $100,000 fine and imprisonment; and a civil
action brought by private plaintiffs. 67
Given the potential for harsh results incident to the use of the treble pen-
alty, either alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, Congress limited the
applicability of the treble penalty. First, a court is not required to issue the full
treble penalty in all cases in which the SEC seeks the penalty. Instead, the court
has "discretion to determine the amount of the penalty. . . in light of the facts
and circumstances."' 68 A court may consider the defendant's level of awareness
and the strength of the evidence as part of the "facts and circumstances."
69
Second, the treble penalty applies only against persons "most directly culpable
in insider trading violations." 70 No person is subject to the treble penalty solely
for "aiding and abetting" a lOb-5 violation unless that person communicates
material, nonpublic information.7 1 Thus, secondary liability under ITSA is lim-
ited to tippers who violate lOb-5; a broker who merely executes the trade is not
subject to the treble penalty.72 Classes excluded from the application of the
treble penalty, however, are still subject to the pre-ITSA enforcement reme-
dies. 73 Third, no person will be subject to the treble penalty solely for employ-
ing another person who is liable under ITSA. 74 Fourth, in establishing a
mechanism for measuring the amount of the treble penalty under ITSA, Con-
gress uses the phrase "profit gained or loss avoided" to mean "the difference
between the purchase or sale price of the security and.., the trading price of
that security a reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic in-
formation."75 Compared to a method that measures the difference between the
nal fine is not limited to insider trading violations; it applies when reporting companies, regulated
entities, or individuals engage in "willful" violations of the Exchange Act. H.R. REP., supra note 5,
at 7 (reporting companies), 10 (broker-dealers), 21 (individuals); 129 CONG. REc. H7013 (daily ed.
Sept. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
66. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 10. John Fedders, former director of SEC enforcement, noted
that with the advent of the treble penalty the Justice Department may shy away from criminal
prosecutions because the defendant is now vulnerable to substantial SEC sanctions. House Hearings,
supra note 5, at 70-71.
67. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 10.
68. H.tL REP., supra note 5, at 8-9; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). The
judge determines the amount of the penalty. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46-47; H.R. REP.,
supra note 5, at 16, 31.
69. H.RL RE'., supra note 5, at 9.
70. Id. at 7; 130 CONG. REc. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); see
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (West Supp. 1985); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 10, 11, 28, 29.
71. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985); HR. REPt'., supra note 5, at 9-10, 28-29; see
130 CONG. REc. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
72. H.L REP., supra note 5, at 9-10. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985); House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 91; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 27-29; 130 CONG. REc. S8913 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); see also 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (Violation of the case law construction of rule lOb-5 is a necessary
ingredient of a treble penalty action.).
73. H.R. REPt., supra note 5, at 9-10, 28-29.
74. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985); House Hearings, supra note 5, at 43-45;
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9, 28.
75. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11, 29; see
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 91.
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purchase and sale price of the actual securities traded, the method applicable
under ITSA restricts an insider's total liability.76 Fifth, ITSA contains a statute
of limitations precluding recovery of the treble penalty more than five years after
the date of the purchase or sale giving rise to a violation. 7 Sixth, ITSA only
applies to transactions "on or through the facilities of a national securities ex-
change or from or through a broker or dealer."178 Public offerings by a securities
issuer, as a general rule, are not covered by ITSA.79 Last, ITSA only extends to
actions instituted by the SEC under the Exchange Act.80
76. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 29. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 42-44. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has rejected an attempt by the SEC to measure the
amount to be disgorged as the difference between the purchase price and the sale price of the actual
securities traded. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1985); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 12.
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 26.
79. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 26 & n.51.
80. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 1, 25. In
addition to these enacted limitations on the use of the treble penalty, other limitations were sug-
gested. First, some commentators argued for the adoption of the "clear and convincing" standard of
proof. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 109, 111-13; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 121, 205.
"[S]ince the penalty may exceed the insider trader's actual or theoretical gain (or avoidance of loss),
the penalty takes on significance as a quasi-criminal punishment, thereby suggesting that a higher
standard of proof may be appropriate." Id. at 121; see also id, supra note 5, at 39, 50 (SEC recog-
nized that some commentators favor a higher standard of proof due to the severity of the penalty);
id. at 63 (SEC director of enforcement would accept higher standard because of the "extraordinary
burden" of the treble penalty, provided that the high burden did not spill over into other enforce-
ment actions). But see Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 40; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46, 65;
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9, 15, 16, 30, 31 (rejects higher proof standard that would hamper SEC's
enforcement of securities law). Ultimately, Congress' intent was to use the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Id The amount of proof, however, is a factor in determining the appropriate
magnitude of the penalty. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9.
Second, it was suggested that the treble penalty apply only to those who knowingly caused the
transaction in question. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 128; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 204,
215. See also House Hearings, supra note 5, at 15 (issue of degree of knowledge raised). Requiring
that a defendant "knowingly cause" a transaction would eliminate liability for recklessness and
would provide a defendant with a protection often available in a criminal action. See id. at 215. This
may be appropriate given the punitive nature of the treble penalty. Congress, however, intended the
level of awareness required for an injunctive action to be applicable in a treble penalty action. H.R.
REP., supra note 5, at 9. As with the amount of proof, the level of awareness is a factor in determin-
ing the appropriate amount of the penalty. Id.
Third, it was suggested that a jury instead of a judge determine the existence of a violation and
the amount of the penalty. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 106; see also id. at 15 (issue raised).
Congress intended the judge to determine the amount of the penalty. Id. at 47; H.R. REP., supra
note 5, at 16, 31. The issue of whether a defendant has a right to a jury trial to decide the question of
liability was reserved for the courts. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 92; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at
16, 31.
Fourth, one commentator suggested the use of either a fixed penalty or a specific standard by
which the courts could determine the appropriate amount of the penalty: "It is not appropriate, and
it may indeed be subject to constitutional question, for the courts to be granted unfettered power to
set their own multiple of a penalty on no specified bases." House Hearings, supra note 5, at 176.
Fifth, many commentators objected to the language of ITSA that describes a violation in terms
of "in possession of" material, nonpublic information. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 99, 109-
111, 116, 127; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 177, 178, 196, 197; see also id. at 15 (issue raised).
But see id. at 49, 50, 71, 72 (preferred "on the basis of" language). These commentators contended
that the case law description of a violation was phrased in terms of trading "on the basis of" inside
information; therefore, the "in possession of" language erroneously describes the violation. Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 111, 116, 127; House Hearings, supra note 5, at 177, 178, 196, 197. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (duty "does not arise from the mere posse3sion of the
nonpublic market information"); In re Investors Management, 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971) (inside informa-
tion must be at least a factor in the investment decision for a violation to exist). The concern with
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IV. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. Overview
ITSA's addition of the treble penalty raises the question whether a plaintiff
in a private action should be able to use offensive nomnutual collateral estoppel
to preclude a defendant previously adjudged liable in an SEC treble penalty ac-
tion from relitigating the issue of a lOb-5 violation. The doctrine of collateral
estoppel operates to preclude relitigation of issues in a second action that were
"actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first proceeding."' 81 Ac-
cording to an earlier mutuality requirement, collateral estoppel was available
only when the parties to the second action were the same as the parties to the
first action.8 2 The modem, prevailing view is that mutuality is not required.8 3
Thus, collateral estoppel may be available to a party who was not a party to the
first action. When the nonparty to the first action is the defendant in the second
action, collateral estoppel is employed defensively, precluding the plaintiff from
relitigating the issue.84 When the nonparty is the plaintiff in the second action,
collateral estoppel is employed offensively, precluding the defendant from reliti-
gating an issue.85
the "in possession of" language was that it "could result in a defacto shift in the burden of proof."
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 110-11. Congress ultimately used the "in possession of" language,
but also made clear that ITSA was not intended to change the case law definition of insider trading.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (West Supp.1985); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
81. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979); 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TicE 0.405[1], at 178-88 (2d ed. 1974); see, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S.
322, 326 (1955); Commissioner v. Sunnenm, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
82. See, eg., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912). For commentary on the mutuality doctrine, see Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to
Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASriNGs L. J.
755 (1980); Currie, Civil Procedure. The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25 (1965); Currie,
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1956);
Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL L. REv. 301 (1961); Over-
ton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral EstoppeL and Conflict of Laws, 44 TENN. L. REv.
927 (1977); Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L. REv.
563 (1980).
83. Eg., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-29 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944, 953-57 (2d Cir.1964), cert denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l.
Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
84. See Note, Collision Course: Collateral Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 57 DEN. L.J. 115, 118-19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Collision Course]; see
also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1971)
(defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel less objectionable than offensive nonmutual collateral estop-
pel); Note, Collision Course, supra, at 118-19 ( The Supreme Court is more inclined to allow a
stranger the use of a prior judgment as a shield rather than a sword."); Note, supra note 82, at 563
(some courts allow defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel only). For cases limiting collat-
eral estoppel to only defensive use, see, eg., Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 484, 562
P.2d 360, 364 (1977); Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 288, 445 P.2d 557, 564 (1968); Tezak
v. Cooper, 24 Il. App. 2d 356, 363, 164 N.E.2d 493, 496 (1960); Albernaz v. City of Fall River, 346
Mass. 336, 339-40, 191 N.E.2d 771, 772-73 (1963).
85. Two reasons have been advanced to show that offensive and defensive collateral estoppel
should be treated differently: (1) offensive collateral estoppel may not promote judicial economy to
the same extent as defensive use, and (2) offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to the defendant.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). Some commentators are reluctant to
sanction offensive use. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L.
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B. Purposes of the Collateral Estoppel Doctrine
The primary purpose of collateral estoppel is to avoid unnecessary relitiga-
tion. s6 "Avoiding relitigation achieves underlying goals of preventing parties
from having more than one day in court, protecting parties from the burden of
relitigation, and reducing court time in the interest of judicial economy."'87
Needless relitigation detracts from the efficient administration of justice. 8  By
precluding relitigation of an insider's lOb-5 violation in a subsequent private
action, collateral estoppel would promote judicial efficiency.89
Furthermore, collateral estoppel, like stare decisis, is of substantial utility in
the ordering of extra-judicial relations. 90 Stare decisis establishes legal norms
that are determinative in similar fact situations. 91 These legal norms provide
citizens with guidance as to their legal rights. Similarly, collateral estoppel pro-
vides finality in the resolution of factual questions by allowing parties to rely on
a judicial determination and to plan their out-of-court decisions accordingly. 92
Additionally, it is essential for a judicial system based on rational decisionmak-
ing to maintain the appearance of rationality in factfinding, exemplified by the
use of the "clearly erroneous test for appellate factual review."93 To categori-
cally reject the use of collateral estoppel in a second action after the issues have
been adjudicated suggests that "the process by which the first action was decided
is itself seriously in need of reform." 94 By providing factfinding finality, collat-
eral estoppel helps preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
REv. 1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a
Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 1010, 1054 (1967); Note, supra note 82, at 563, 574.
The Supreme Court allows offensive collateral estoppel and accounts for the potential negative
effects of offensive use by granting the trial judge "broad discretion to determine when it should be
applied." Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENIS § 88 reporter's
note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1975) (suggests de-emphasizing distinction between offensive and defen-
sive collateral estoppel and stressing whether the party against whom estoppel is sought could have
joined). The suggestion made by the RESrATEMENT is discussed in Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330 n.13,
331 n.16.
86. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Note, supra note 82, at 570.
Other litigation-saving devices include counterclaims, intervention, interpleader, and joinder. See
FED. L Civ. P. 18-22, 24; Note, supra note 82, at 570.
87. Note, supra note 82, at 570. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
88. Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967); Note, supra note
82, at 572 ("Society has a right to the efficient administration ofjustice. ... ."). Needless litigation
is a particularly serious problem in light of the rising caseloads in some urban courts. See Note,
Collision Course, supra note 84, at 117.
89. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Note, supra note 82, at 572.
Application of collateral estoppel would save time in the context of securities litigation. Note, Mutu-
ality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect ofParklane Hosiery, 63 CORNELL L. REv.
1002, 1013-14 (1979).
90. Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 812. See George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane
Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REv. 655, 685 (1980).
91. George, supra note 90, at 685. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. Rnv. 1057, 1094-95
(1975).
92. Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 763-64; George, supra note 90, at 685.
93. George, supra note 90, at 765.
94. Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 765.
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C. Prerequisites for the Application of Collateral Estoppel
There are three preliminary requirements for the application of collateral
estoppel: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must have been identical
to the issue presented in the subsequent action; (2) the party against whom col-
lateral estoppel is asserted must have been "a party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication"; 9" and (3) the prior adjudication must have produced a
final judgment on the merits.96 Meeting these prerequisites triggers the second
phase of the analysis: whether the defendant had a "full and fair" opportunity
to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.97 The party seeking to employ col-
lateral estoppel has the burden of proving that the prerequisites are satisfied.98
Should this party meet the burden of proof, the party to be estopped then has the
burden of proving that the initial opportunity to litigate the issue was less than
full and fair.99
Because the standards for establishing a lOb-5 violation are the same for
private and SEC actions, i0 there is an identity between the violation issues in
both actions. A private plaintiff bringing a claim following a treble penalty ac-
tion in which the SEC prevailed on the merits should be able to employ collat-
eral estoppel to preclude the insider from relitigating the issue of the insider's
lOb-5 violation, unless the insider demonstrates that under the circumstances
the application of collateral estoppel would be unfair.
95. Due process prohibits application of collateral estoppel against a nonparty to the first ac-
tion, unless the nonparty is in privity with a party to the first action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (findings are binding only on
parties who have had an opportunity to participate in the litigation).
96. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-324
(1971); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895
(1942); Note, Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior Equitable Determinations in SECActions Upon Sub-
sequent Private Legal Actions Does Not Violate the 7th Amendment: Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 10
Cum. L. P~v. 619, 623 (1979) [hereinafter cite as Note, CollateralEstoppel]; see Note, supra note 82,
at 576.
97. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328, 333 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); see Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 62
(5th Cir. 1970); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967); Note,
supra note 82, at 576-77.
98. See Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 73, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969); Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 774 (citing Schwartz).
99. Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 774. See Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F.
Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 146-47, 225 N.E.2d 195,
198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 600-01 (1967); Note, supra note 82, at 577. Numerous factors are relevant to
the fairness determination: (1) the defendant's incentive to fully litigate the issue in the first suit (see
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330, 332 (1979); Pickholz & Brodsky, supra, note 33,
at 54; Note, supra note 89, at 1011-12. Note, Collision Course, supra note 84, at 120; Note, supra note
82, at 581); (2) the ease with which the defendant could have joined in the first action (see Parklane,
439 U.S. at 331-32; Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 785; Note, Collision Course, supra note 84, at
118; Note, supra note 89, at 1011; Note, supra note 82, at 581, 584-86; see also Callen & Kadue,
supra note 82, at 779-85 (discussion of the impact of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel on the
incidence ofjoinder in the initial action)); (3) judicial economy (see Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330; Callen
& Kadue, supra note 82, at 780-85; Note, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 96, at 631 (referring to
judicial economy); Note, supra note 82, at 572-75, 584; supra note 85); (4) the adequacy of the
procedural opportunities of the first suit (Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 777; Note, Collision
Course, supra note 84, at 122; Note, supra note 82, at 577-79; see Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332.). Ulti-
mately, the court in its discretion determines whether it would be fair to apply collateral estoppel in
any particular case. See supra text accompanying note 97.
100. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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The elements of an SEC lOb-5 action and a private lOb-5 action have not
always been the same. Before the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Aaron v.
SEC,101 courts were split on whether the level of awareness required to establish
a defendant's lOb-5 violation in an SEC action corresponded to that required in
a private action.' 02 In a 1978 decision, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,l03 the
Supreme Court held that a private plaintiff must show scienter'0 4 to establish a
lOb-5 violation.105 The Court left open the question whether scienter must be
proved in an SEC action.10 6 In United States courts of appeal in which scienter
was not required in an SEC lOb-5 action, a private plaintiff theoretically could
not employ collateral estoppel because there would be no identity of the ele-
ments of the two actions.10 7
The Supreme Court in Aaron, however, held that scienter was also a re-
quirement for an SEC lOb-5 action.108 The Court noted that "scienter" refers to
the same level of awareness as the term connoted in Hochfelder.109 Hence, the
defendant's level of awareness in both private and SEC actions is the same, facil-
itating issue identity and thus the use of collateral estoppel. As in Hochfelder,
the Supreme Court in Aaron expressly refrained from deciding "whether, under
some circumstances, scienter may also include reckless behavior." 110 Since
Hochfelder, however, the courts of appeal have agreed that "recklessness" is a
sufficient level of awareness on which to base a lOb-5 action, at least when the
101. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
102. See Hazen, supra note 30, at 454-55 (pre-Aaron discussion of requisite culpability); Pickholz
& Brodsky, supra note 33, at 53; Note, Judgments--Res Judicata-Estoppel-Right to Trial By Jury,
48 CiN. L. REv. 611, 620-21 (1979). Although scienter was required in private actions, most United
States courts of appeal before Aaron did not require scienter in SEC injunction actions. Eg., SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149,
1167 (D.C. Cir 1978) (SEC not required to prove scienter under § 13(d)(1)); SEC v. American Re-
alty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1978) (SEC not required to prove scienter under
§ 17(a)(2)); SEC v. World Radio Mission Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (SEC not required to
prove scienter under § 17(a)); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976)(SEC not required to prove scienter under § 5), cert denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Spectrum
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). But see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (SEC must
prove scienter in § 10(b) action).
103. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
104. Scienter refers to "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. Scienter is a higher level of awareness than negligence. See gener-
ally Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions Under 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: A
Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978) (discussing scienter requirements under 10(b) and
lOb-5 as developed by federal courts).
105. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-14.
106. Id. at 193 n.12.
107. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 96-97 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978); Pickholz &
Brodsky, supra note 33, at 52-53; Note, supra note 102, at 620; see Hazen, supra note 30, at 455. For
the scienter issue to be given preclusive effect in a subsequent private action, the level established in
the SEC action must have been necessary to the result reached. See Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note
33, at 53. Scienter was not a necessary element of an SEC 10b-5 action in jurisdictions which al-
lowed a mere showing of negligence. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734 (1974) (flexible
duty standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967) (negligence sufficient), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (knowledge not
required). Thus, even when scienter was established in an SEC lOb-5 action, collateral estoppel was
inapplicable in a subsequent private action.
108. 446 U.S. at 695.
109. Id. at 686 n.5.
110. Id.
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action is brought by a private plaintiff.'I' The question arises whether reckless-
ness also will be a sufficient basis for liability in an SEC treble penalty action.
Given the severity of the treble penalty, some commentators contended
during the legislative process that ITSA should apply only to persons who
"knowingly cause" the transaction in question." 2 Congress, however, clearly
refused to make this strict definition of "scienter" a requirement for the treble
penalty: "The legislation is not intended to change current law with respect to
the level of awareness required of a violator." 113 In expressly rejecting "know-
ingly cause" as the required level of awareness, Congress implicitly recognized
and sanctioned the inclusion of "recklessness" in the scope of scienter for the
purposes of an SEC treble penalty. Even if the courts of appeal or the Supreme
Court were to differentiate between private and SEC treble penalty actions and
disallow recklessness as a sufficient basis for an SEC treble penalty action, collat-
eral estoppel would be available to a private plaintiff. The requirement that the
SEC demonstrate an extra quantum of awareness should not negate the estab-
lishment of a lesser-included level of awareness; thus, establishing scienter would
suffice to prove recklessness.
D. Fairness in The Application of Collateral Estoppel
1. Incentive to Fully Litigate
If an SEC treble penalty action ends with a judgment on the merits and the
issue identity prerequisite of collateral estoppel is satisfied, a court then must
decide whether it would be fair to preclude the same defendant from relitigating
the issue of a lOb-5 violation in a subsequent private action.114 Fairness is deter-
mined by reference to many factors, one of which is whether the defendant had
an adequate incentive in a prior adjudication to fully litigate the issue of a lOb-5
violation. 115 When a defendant has not had an adequate incentive "to fully and
111. Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1980); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery
of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418 (5th
Cir. 1980); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980); Mclean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d
1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Hoffman
v. Estabrook & Co., Inc., 587 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1978); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastmany, Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978). One court noted that:
"Reckless conduct may be defined as... highly unreasonable (conduct) involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it."
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.) (quoting Franke v. Midwest-
ern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 724 (W.D. Okla. 1976)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
Presumably, recklessness also will be a sufficient basis for liability in an SEC treble penalty action.
112. See supra note 80.
113. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9.
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330, 332 (1979); Pickholz & Brodsky,
supra note 33, at 54 (1978); Note, supra note 89, at 1011-12; Note, Collision Course, supra note 84,
at 120; Note, supra note 82, at 588.
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vigorously" 116 litigate an issue in a prior adjudication, collateral estoppel is in-
applicable.' 17 If one party is uninterested in the resolution of a particular issue,
a basic element of the adversary system is missing-the balance afforded by the
vigorous presentation of both sides of an issue-and the issue will not be fully
litigated. In such a case, fairness dictates the denial of collateral estoppel.
In determining the incentive to litigate, "[c]ourts must look to tangible in-
dicators, such as the amount of damages, the seriousness of the allegations, and
the foreseeability of future suits to determine whether a defendant was moti-
vated to defend vigorously."' Is Because a defendant in an SEC treble penalty
action faces significant monetary liability and the likelihood of future private
actions, 119 a court in a subsequent private action should conclude that the de-
fendant had adequate incentive to litigate the lOb-5 violation. In Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore,' 20 the Supreme Court held that an SEC injunction action was
sufficiently serious to motivate a defendant to fully litigate the issue whether a
proxy statement issued by the defendant "was materially false and mislead-
ing." 121 The Court added that a subsequent action by a private party was fore-
seeable "in light of the serious allegations made in the SEC's complaint... as
well as the foreseeability of subsequent private suits that typically follow a suc-
cessful Government judgment .... 12
Under Parklane, the treble penalty, which is clearly a more severe remedy
than an injunction, would be viewed as sufficiently serious to motivate a defend-
ant to litigate the case vigorously, and a private action following an SEC treble
penalty action would be foreseeable. Furthermore, the defendant is motivated to
strongly contest an SEC lawsuit to avoid the negative publicity of an adverse
judgment.123
2. Joinder
Another factor in the fairness determination is the ease with which the
party asserting collateral estoppel could have joined in the prior action. 124
When parties capable ofjoining decide to await the outcome of the action before
bringing a separate action, the number of suits litigated increases and the policy
116. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979).
117. Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note 33, at 54; Note, supra note 82, at 581. The Supreme Court
has expressly noted that a defendant in an SEC injunction action is afforded a "full and fair opportu-
nity" to litigate. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979).
118. Note, supra note 82, at 581-82; see also Note, Collision Course supra note 84, at 120 (collat-
eral estoppel inoperative when the recurrence of an issue was unforeseeable during the initial action).
119. In terms of establishing a lOb-5 violation and determining whether a subsequent private
action is foreseeable, an SEC injunction and treble penalty action are synonymous. A private action
is clearly foreseeable following a SEC injunctive action; in fact, "[o]ne purpose of an SEC injunctive
action is to alert potential plaintiffs to securities law violations." Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note 33,
at 54 ("SEC defendants are unlikely to be surprised by subsequent damage actions.").
120. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
121. Id. at 325, 333.
122. Id. at 332.
123. See Bialkin, The Impact of Parklane Hosiery: A Change in Litigation Strategy, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 26, 1979, at 22, col. 4; Hazen, supra note 30, at 453; Note, supra note 89, at 1012-1013 n.46.
124. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331-32; Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 785; Note, supra note
89, at 1011; Note, Collision Course, supra note 84, at 118; Note, supra note 82, at 581, 584-86.
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goal of judicial economy is undermined. 125 Because the primary purpose of col-
lateral estoppel is to promote judicial economy, courts hesitate to apply the doc-
trine when it runs contrary to that purpose. 126 In contrast to defensive
collateral estoppel, offensive collateral estoppel induces a nonparty capable of
joining to adopt a "wait and see" posture, awaiting the outcome of one or more
suits against the defendant with the hope that a necessary issue will be decided
against the defendant, thereby allowing the "wait and see" plaintiff to prevail on
that issue with minimal effort in a subsequent action against the same defend-
ant. 127 Recognizing this danger, the Supreme Court has determined that "if a
nonparty plaintiff could easily have joined" in the prior action, collateral estop-
pel is not available in a subsequent action.
128
Section 78u(g) of the Exchange Act precludes joinder by a private plaintiff
in an SEC action unless the SEC consents to the consolidation. 12 9 Because the
SEC generally is opposed to consolidation, joinder of a nonparty is unlikely. 130
Thus, the statute and SEC policy prevent a private plaintiff from easily joining
an SEC treble penalty action. Insofar as the opportunity to join bears on the
application of collateral estoppel, a private plaintiff should be able to use collat-
eral estoppel following an SEC treble penalty action.
3. Judicial Economy
Because the primary purpose of collateral estoppel is to promote judicial
efficiency, the availability of collateral estoppel in a private action is partly con-
tingent on whether it will promote this goal. The judicial economy in avoiding
relitigation of a defendant's lOb-5 violation must be weighed against any in-
crease in litigation resulting from the use of collateral estoppel. 13 1 Collateral
estoppel can increase litigation in three ways. First, it can increase litigation
within the original suit: "[L]itigants may feel bound to fight a case to the utmost
125. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30; Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327
P.2d 111, 115 (1958); Reardon v. Allen, 88 NJ. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (Law Div.
1965); Note, supra note 82, at 575-76.
126. See supra notes 85 & 88. Defensive collateral estoppel "induces joinder by its application
because a plaintiff threatened by future estoppel is motivated to join all of his defendants." Note,
supra note 82, at 584; see Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30. The availability of defensive collateral
estoppel thus decreases not only litigation in actions in which it is asserted (issue preclusion), but
also the number of separate suits litigated.
127. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330; Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 784-85; Note, supra note 82,
at 584.
128. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1982) provides in part: "[No action for equitable relief instituted by
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission... shall be consolidated or coordinated with other
actions not brought by the Commission, even though such other actions may involve common ques-
tions of fact, unless such consolidation is consented to by the Commission." See Note, supra note 89,
at 1011.
130. See Amicus Brief of SEC at 30-31, Parklane (commissioners concern with consolidation of
private actions and injunctions). This brief states: "Private actions.. . may consume years for
pretrial discovery alone. The Commission's ability to protect the public during that period wouid be
seriously impaired if injunctive proceedings were postponed at the request of private litigants or
delayed by requests for jury trials." Id.; see also SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236,
1240 (2d Cir. 1972) (Intervention by private plaintiffs in SEC enforcement actions would substan-
tially increase the SEC workload, complicate the cases, and possibly discourage consent decrees.).
131. See Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 780.
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in both trial and appellate courts which [they] would treat rather casually if its
sole effect were on the immediate adversaries." 132 The availability of collateral
estoppel, however, does not cause an increase in litigation in the original suit
when the suit itself threatens the defendant with serious consequences.
Second, collateral estoppel can increase litigation within the subsequent
suit: "Rather than engage in relitigation of issues, parties will contest the appli-
cation of nonmutual collateral estoppel .... -133 Any additional litigation
within a subsequent suit incident to the application of collateral estoppel, how-
ever, is more than offset by the economy in not relitigating issues common to
both suits. 134 This is particularly true for cases in which the resolution of the
issues in dispute is a lengthy and complicated process, such as establishing an
insider's lOb-5 violation. 135 In addition, because the elements of a lOb-5 viola-
tion are the same for both an SEC and a private action, 13 6 the prerequisites of
collateral estoppel should be met easily and quickly in the subsequent private
action, leaving only the determination of whether it would be fair in that case to
apply collateral estoppel. Unless an SEC treble penalty case contains facts suffi-
ciently unusual to warrant special attention by a judge making the fairness deter-
mination, the stare decisis effect from early collateral estoppel cases should
substantially limit the judicial energy expended on the fairness determination,
probably by way of a partial summary judgment.
Third, the availability of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel can in-
crease the number of suits brought. 137 The increase can occur in two ways:
(1) "wait and see plaintiffs," who usually would join in the initial action were it
not for the availability of collateral estoppel, can await the outcome of that ac-
tion before bringing a second action hoping to use collateral estoppel, 138 and (2)
"reluctant plaintiffs,"' 139 who usually would forego the opportunity to sue at all,
bring an action because they can use the findings of the prior action. 14° Practi-
cally speaking, "wait and see plaintiffs" do not exist in the context of a lOb-5
private action because their existence is contingent upon the availability of join-
der in the initial action. The statutory obstacle to joinder in an SEC action
negates any causal relationship between the availability of collateral estoppel
and an increase in the number of suits brought by "wait and see plaintiffs."
The "reluctant plaintiff," however, is another matter. Assuming the advent
of the treble penalty increases the number of SEC actions in which a defendant
is found to have violated lOb-5, the use of collateral estoppel following an SEC
132. P- FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 859
(3d. ed. 1973), quoted in Note, supra note 82, at 572.
133. Note, supra note 82, at 573.
134. Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 784-85.
135. Note, supra note 89, at 1013-14. See Amicus Brief of SEC at 2 n.1, Parklane; see also
SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972) (security cases are
"complicated").
136. Supra text accompanying note 100.
137. See supra note 85 and text accompanying notes 125-28.
138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
139. Calen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 779.
140. Id.; Note, supra note 102, at 620.
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treble penalty action could induce plaintiffs, who otherwise would not sue, to
bring a private action. 14 1 Any increase in litigation, however, must be weighed
against the positive consequences of compensating injured investors and achiev-
ing deterrence through enforcement of the securities laws.' 4 2 In sum, the bene-
fits of judicial economy in avoiding relitigation of a defendant's lOb-5 violation,
combined with the benefits of increased deterrence and compensation, all inci-
dent to the availability of collateral estoppel to a plaintiff in a private action,
clearly outweigh any increase in the number of suits initiated.
4. Procedural Opportunities
Also relevant to the fairness determination are the procedural opportunities
afforded an insider in an SEC treble penalty action. 143 Without full and fair
procedural opportunities to litigate in the original suit, a court will deny collat-
eral estoppe.1 44 Fullness of opportunity is measured by comparing the original
and subsequent suits.' 45 If the subsequent suit affords procedural opportunities
unavailable in the original suit, then the procedural opportunities in the original
suit may have been less than full.14 6 Fairness connotes the lack of procedural
disadvantages in the original suit. 147 Because cases should be decided on their
merits, any procedural rule that gives one party an advantage over the other or
that prevents a decision on the merits may constitute unfairness.14 8 Slight pro-
cedural disadvantages, however, will not provide a sufficient basis to deny collat-
eral estoppel; only when the disadvantages "could readily cause a different
result" should collateral estoppel be denied.
149
The availability of jury trial'50 and compromise verdicts' 5 ' also bear on
141. Note, supra note 102, at 620
142. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 (1970); JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 430-34 (1964); Note, supra note 102, at 620 (private actions supplement SEC enforcement
actions and provide an additional deterrent against violations of the securities laws); Note supra note
89, at 1013.
143. Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 777; Note, Collision Course, supra note 84, at 122; Note,
supra note 82, at 577-79; see Parklane, 434 U.S. at 332.
144. Note, supra note 82, at 577; see supra notes 97 & 99 and accompanying text.
145. Note, supra note 82, at 577.
146. Id.; see also Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31 (It may be unfair to apply offensive collateral
estoppel when a second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities that were unavailable
in the first action but that could readily cause a different result.).
147. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 328; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Callen & Kadue, supra note 82, at 777; Note, supra note 82, at
577.
148. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1982). One commentator has listed several
factors that courts consider in deciding whether a prior opportunity to litigate was procedurally fair,
including
[c]hoice of forum, availability of jury trial, differences between administrative and civil
proceedings, differences in evidentiary rules, availability of procedural devices such as dis-
covery and counterclaims, adequacy of representation, availability of new evidence, oppor-
tunity to call witnesses, length of trial, jury prejudice, compromise verdicts, and differences
in available law.
Note, supra note 82, at 578.
149. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331; see Note, Collison Course, supra note 84, at 122.
150. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) op JuDnpmENTs § 88 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976)
(suggests that availability of jury trial in second action is a "fuller procedural opportunity"); Note,
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whether an insider was afforded a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate in an
SEC treble penalty action. Collateral estoppel can have the effect of denying a
party the right to a jury trial.1 52 Generally, the right to a jury trial is available
when a party seeks damages, but is unavailable when a party seels only equita-
ble relief.153 Issues resolved in an equitable action, however, could be raised in a
subsequent damage action, causing the use of collateral estoppel to conflict with
a party's right to a jury trial. 154 In this situation collateral estoppel may be
available, even though it may deprive the party against whom it is asserted the
right to a jury trial on the issues previously litigated. 155 In Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore,156 the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a private action follow-
ing an SEC injunction action did not have a sufficient basis for contesting the
application of collateral estoppel, despite the resulting loss of the right to a jury
trial on the issues common to both proceedings. 157
The legislative history of ITSA indicates that in an SEC action the judge
will determine the amount of the penalty, 158 and the evolving case law will de-
termine whether the defendant has a right to a jury trial under the seventh
amendment on the issue of an alleged lOb-5 violation.'5 9 If defendants are de-
nied a jury trial in SEC actions, the application of collateral estoppel in a subse-
quent private action will deprive them of the right to a jury trial in a suit for
damages. Parklane, however, suggests that this loss of the right to a jury trial is
not a sufficiently serious procedural disadvantage to deny application of collat-
eral estoppel. 16°
Indications of a compromise verdict in the prior action may preclude appli-
cation of collateral estoppel in a subsequent action. 16' A compromise verdict is
a damage award that is substantially less than the amount requested, suggesting
that the court was both uncertain on the issue of the defendant's liability and
uncomfortable about denying the plaintiff compensation. 162 Another explana-
tion for a minimal award is that the court, after resolutely ascertaining the de-
fendant's liability, awarded damages based solely on the extent of the plaintiff's
injury. When the minimal award is a compromise verdict, collateral estoppel
should be denied in a subsequent action because the defendant's liability remains
supra note 82, at 578-79. But see Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332 n.19 (presence or absence of jury as
factfinder is basically neutral). See generally Note, supra note 82, at 578-81 (discussion of procedural
opportunities and risk of unfairness).
151. See Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 896-97, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (1957); Note, supra
note 82, at 578-79.
152. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332 n.19.
153. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem.
Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978).
154. See eg., Parklane, 439 U.S. at 324-25.
155. Id. at 334-35, 337.
156. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
157. Id.
158. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46-47; H.R. REP., supra note 5 at 31.
159. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 92; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 16, 31.
160. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 337.
161. See eg., Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 896-97, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (1957).
162. See id.
[Vol. 64
INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS
in question. 163 Collateral estoppel should be available, however, when the mini-
mal award reflects the court's honest assessment of the extent of the injury. In-
stead of leaving a court to decide between these two competing explanations,
fairness dictates that a defendant be allowed to relitigate the alleged liability
whenever the initial judgment could be the result of a compromise verdict.
A judge in an SEC treble penalty action has broad discretion to determine
the appropriate amount of the penalty "in light of the facts and circum-
stances."' 164 The issue of a compromise verdict could arise if the judge orders
the defendant to pay only the slightest proportion of the illicit profits-a nomi-
nal penalty-rather than the full treble penalty. 165 Theoretically, establishing a
lOb-5 violation is a prerequisite to assessing even a nominal penalty. The deter-
mination of a lOb-5 violation and the amount of the penalty are separate inquir-
ies constituting a two step process for applying the treble penalty. The amount
of the penalty is determined only if a lOb-5 violation is found. Thus, any suc-
cessful SEC treble damage action, regardless of the magnitude of the penalty,
should indicate that the defendant violated lOb-5, justifying application of col-
lateral estoppel in a subsequent private action. In practice, however, a nominal
penalty might indicate that the judge was uncertain of the defendant's liability
and rendered a compromise verdict. The possibility that a nominal penalty is a
result of a compromise verdict arguably is a sufficient basis to deny collateral
estoppel in a subsequent private action because any doubts as to whether an
issue has been litigated fully and fairly should be resolved in favor of the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. Denying collateral estoppel merely
forces the private plaintiff to prove a basic element of the case-that the defend-
ant violated lOb-5. Applying collateral estoppel, however, leaves the defendant
unable to contest the allegation of wrongful conduct; the defendant can argue
only that the violative conduct did not cause the plaintiff's injury.
Furthermore, the award of a nominal penalty should be interpreted in light
of other disadvantages a defendant faces when contesting an SEC action. The
superior resources and favorable image of the SEC work to the defendant's dis-
advantage.1 66 "IT]he SEC may succeed in establishing securities violations
where private litigants would fail."' 167 The expertise of SEC lawyers, combined
with the SEC's substantial financial resources, rarely can be matched by private
litigants. 168 In addition, the SEC is perceived as representing the public inter-
est, 169 whereas private litigants are perceived as seeking a financial gain. "As a
result, fact-finders may subconsciously give greater weight to allegations and
163. See id.; Note, supra note 82, at 578-79.
164. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9; see supra note 68.
165. The judge has discretion to impose any penalty that does not exceed three times the amount
of the illicit profits. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1985). Accordingly, a judge might
require the defendant to pay only a slight fraction of the amount of illicit profits.
166. See Note, supra note 89, at 1014 n.55.
167. Id. at 1014.
168. See Merrifield, Investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Bus. LAW.
1583, 1627 n.160 (1977) (remarks of Kenneth Bialkin, ABA Annual Convention); Note, supra note
89, at 1014 n.55; The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. RaV. 219, 225 n.50 (1979).
169. Note, supra note 89, at 1014 n.55.
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evidence presented by the SEC."170 Ultimately, when an action is brought by
the SEC, a lesser measure of culpability may be required to establish a lOb-5
violation than when the action is brought by a private plaintiff.17 1
Thus, any doubts whether a nominal penalty accurately indicates a lOb-5
violation are compounded by both the probable predisposition of the courts to
find a violation on a lesser margin of culpability in an SEC action and by the
superior resources of the SEC. Given the disproportionate impacts of applying
versus denying collateral estoppel, these doubts should be resolved in favor of
the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought. Therefore, a nominal pen-
alty in an SEC treble penalty action is inadequate evidence that the issue of a
defendant's alleged lOb-5 violation has been fully and fairly litigated.
E. Policy Considerations
The conflicting policy goals of enhancing deterrence and avoiding coerced
settlements also are important considerations in determining whether collateral
estoppel is appropriate. When a defendant is vulnerable to both SEC sanctions
and private money damages, the risks associated with detection are significantly
increased. One purpose of SEC injunction actions, in fact, is "to alert potential
private plaintiffs to securities law violations."' 172 The availability of collateral
estoppel increases both the number and success rate of private actions, thus fur-
thering deterrence.173
The policy goal of avoiding coerced settlements' 74 conflicts with the use of
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note 33, at 54.
173. See Note, supra note 102, at 620; Note, supra note 89, at 1013.
174. See Bialkin, supra note 123, at 22; Note, supra note 89, at 1014; see also Brodsky, Collateral
Estoppel in SEC Injunctive Actions, 179 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1978) (Offensive collateral estoppel threatens
SEC defendants with the loss of the right to a jury trial in a private damage action and thus induces
settlement.); Hazen, supra note 30, at 450 ("collateral estoppel effect that might apply to fully liti-
gated injunction order does not attach to a consent decree"); Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note 33, at
60 (availability of offensive collateral estoppel puts pressure on SEC defendants to settle); Note,
supra note 102, at 621 (availability of offensive collateral estoppel will encourage consent judgments
in SEC actions because consent judgments "are not final judgments and therefore not subject to
collateral estoppe"); See generally Dent, supra note 30, at 946-50 (discussion of consent decrees).
The policy of avoiding coerced settlements is evidenced in the antitrust area; the finding of an
antitrust violation in a government enforcement action is only prima fade evidence of a violation in a
subsequent private action. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982) (Clayton Act § 5(a)). According to a majority
of courts, collateral estoppel is unavailable in private antitrust actions that follow government en-
forcement actions. North Carolina v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67, 73-74 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589-90 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); United States v.
Grinnel Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1097, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see Note, supra note 89, at 1015 n.57.
For a source supporting the majority view, see Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and Offensive
Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Section 5(a) and Antitrust Damage Actions]. Some courts and commentators interpret § 5(a) as not
preempting the common law, but rather as setting a minimum standard; accordingly, they believe
that collateral estoppel should be available in private treble damage actions. See Fleer Corp. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1976); ANTITRUST COMMISSION
REPORT, 80 F.R.D. 509, 593 (1979) (majority of the National Commission for the Review of Anti-
trust Laws and Procedures recommended amending § 5(a) of the Clayton Act to make clear that
collateral estoppel is available following government action); Comment, The Use of Government
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collateral estoppel in private actions. 175 As the risks associated with an unfavor-
able judgment increase, the incentive to avoid the judgment becomes greater. To
a defendant in an SEC action, the threat of issue preclusion and of the loss of the
jury trial right in a subsequent private action magnifies the risks associated with
an unfavorable judgment in an SEC action. 176 Thus, even before ITSA, the SEC
had the power to persuade defendants to enter into consent judgments, "which
are not final judgments and therefore are not subject to collateral estoppel."' 177
By entering into a consent judgment, an SEC defendant could "preserve his jury
trial right in a subsequent private action ' 178 and "force private plaintiffs to
prove independently the elements of their damage claim."'17 9
Although consent judgments promote judicial economy,180 a contrary pol-
icy concern is that nonculpable defendants may be coerced into entering consent
judgments.18 ' Even before ITSA, a nonculpable SEC defendant might agree to
a consent judgment based on a cost-benefit analysis of the alleged trading.18 2 To
the extent that the fear of collateral estoppel in subsequent private actions ac-
counts for coerced consent judgments, public policy disfavors the application of
collateral estoppel in subsequent private actions.
The enactment of ITSA, however, renders the risk of collateral estoppel a
secondary consideration to the risk of a potentially enormous fine. An SEC de-
fendant's willingness to enter into a consent judgment is primarily contingent on
Judgments in Pr'vate Antitrust Litigation: Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppej and Jury
Trial, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 338, 374-75 (1976); Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and the Use of
Collateral Estoppel by a Private Plaintiff in a Treble Damage Action, 8 U.S.F.L. PRv. 74, 89 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Section 5(a) and the Use of Collateral Estoppel].
Although the combined litigation risks to SEC and antitrust defendants are roughly equivalent,
the power to coerce a defendant into a consent judgment is greater in the antitrust context. An
antitrust defendant's primary concern is to avoid paying treble damages in a private action. The
availability of collateral estoppel figures strongly in an antitrust defendant's assessment of whether to
enter a consent judgment, which explains courts' reluctance to apply collateral estoppel in this con-
text. To an SEC defendant, however, the availability of collateral estoppel is of secondary impor-
tance in the assessment of whether to enter a consent judgment. An SEC defendant's chief concern
is not with the risks inherent in a subsequent private action but with the risk of paying a treble
penalty in the SEC action. Because the analogy between SEC and antitrust actions is imperfect, the
policy goal of avoiding coerced settlements does not justify categorically denying the application of
collateral estoppel in the SEC context in the same way that it jusitifies such a denial in the antitrust
context. However, a judge in a private action following an SEC action under ITSA should take this
policy goal into account in determining whether to grant the plaintiff the benefit of collateral
estoppel.
175. See Note, supra note 89, at 1014-15.
176. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 355-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brodsky, supra note 174, at 1;
Pickholz & Brodsky, supra note 33, at 60; Note, supra note 89, at 1014-15.
177. Note, supra note 102, at 621; see Parklane, 439 U.S. at 355-56 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting);
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1955); R. JENNDcS & H. MARSH,
SEcURTmrEs REGULATIONS 1258 (5th ed. 1982); Dent. supra note 30, at 948-49; Hazen, supra note
30, at 450; Merrifield, supra note 168, at 1627; Note, supra note 89, at 1014 n.53.
178. Note, supra note 102, at 621.
179. Note, supra note 89, at 1014-15; see Merrifield, supra note 168, at 1627.
180. See SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The SEC can
bring the large number of enforcement actions it does only because in all but a few cases consent
decrees are entered."); see also Dent, supra note 30, at 949 (Enforcement proceedings are "lengthy";
consent judgments are "quick.").
181. See supra note 174.
182. See supra note 174.
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the extent to which the SEC will make concessions on the amount of the pen-
alty. If the risks of issue preclusion and the loss of defendant's jury trial rights
were sufficiently serious to cause pre-ITSA nonculpable defendants to enter con-
sent judgments, the additional risk of paying a treble penalty renders ITSA de-
fendants practically powerless to refuse settlement opportunities. This is
particularly true when the SEC agrees to impose only a small penalty. To the
extent that the treble penalty increases the SEC's power to coerce consent judg-
ments and to dictate the terms of the judgments, public policy weighs against the
use of collateral estoppel in private actions. Denying collateral estoppel would
reduce some of the litigation risks to an SEC defendant, decreasing the SEC's
bargaining power to coerce nonculpable defendants to enter consent judgments.
F. Summary of Collateral Estoppel
Judicial precedent indicates that collateral estoppel will be available to a
private plaintiff following an SEC treble penalty action.183 On balance, applica-
tion of collateral estoppel in a private action would be fair-(1) an SEC defend-
ant, confronted with the risk of paying a treble penalty, would have a sufficient
incentive to vigorously litigate the issue of the alleged lob-5 violation; (2) poten-
tial private plaintiffs can not "easily join" in an SEC treble penalty action;
(3) application of collateral estoppel would promote judicial economy; (4) the
procedural opportunities afforded an SEC defendant, except in cases ending with
compromise verdicts, would be full and fair; and (5) the danger of an increase in
the number of coerced settlements is offset by the increase in judicial economy,
the primary policy goal of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, however, should not be applied indiscriminately. An
SEC defendant faces the procedural disadvantages not only of confronting the
resources and status of the SEC, but also of losing the right to a jury trial in a
subsequent private action. Hence, before applying collateral estoppel, a judge in
a private action should ascertain whether an SEC defendant has encountered
other procedural disadvantages. When in doubt, the judge should deny the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel, particularly when the SEC treble penalty action
ended with a compromise verdict.
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. Overview
A second major issue arising from the enactment of ITSA is whether sub-
jecting an inside trader to both a treble penalty action and a criminal prosecu-
tion, regardless of the sequence in which the two suits are brought, violates the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The fifth amendment prohibits
placing a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense.' 84 Whether an inside
183. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331; see R. JENNiNGs & H. MARSH, supra note 177, at 1258.
184. The fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment by a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
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trader can successfully invoke the double jeopardy clause depends on the satis-
faction of two requirements: (1) the criminal prosecution and the treble penalty
action must involve the "same offense"; and (2) the SEC treble penalty action
must be "essentially criminal."' 1 5 The following factors strongly suggest that an
inside trader will be able to satisfy these requirements: the purposes behind the
double jeopardy clause, 18 6 the punitive nature of the treble penalty,' 8 7 the intent
of Congress, 188 and considerations of fairness. 189
B. The Purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The double jeopardy clause is intended to afford a defendant finality.190
[It is] designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged
offense. .. . [The] underlying idea... is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.191
Thus, the double jeopardy clause is designed to protect a defendant not only
from double conviction, but also from the anxieties and risks incident to a sec-
ond prosecution. Hence, the clause forbids a second prosecution regardless of
whether the initial prosecution resulted in a conviction or acquittal. 192 This
limitation on the state assumes that courts will punish offenders fully in the
initial trial. 193
Another purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to protect people from
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himsel, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
185. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398
(1938)). See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam);
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943); see also J. SIGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 60-62 (1969).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 295-97. For statements concerning the purposes behind
the double jeopardy clause, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); Note, A Definition
of Punishment for Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple Punishment Prohibition, 90
YALE LJ. 632 (1981).
187. See generally infra text accompanying notes 253-93 (discussing the application of the treble
penalty as a punitive sanction).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 265-79.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 292 & 298.
190. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92
(1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 39; Note,
supra note 186, at 634.
191. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
192. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see United States v. Candelaria, 131 F.
Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Note, Missouri v. Hunter and the Legislature: Double Punishment With-
out Double Jeopardy, 37 ARY. L. REv. 1000, 1002 (1984).
193. Note, supra note 186, at 637-38.
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punishment that is not commensurate with their degree of culpability. 194 Ac-
cordingly, the clause places restrictions on a court's authority to punish a de-
fendant. A court cannot impose a sanction not authorized by the legislature; 195
and as a general rule, a court cannot increase the severity of a punishment once a
defendant has begun to serve a sentence. 196 In the event a defendant succeeds in
vacating a conviction and subsequently is reconvicted and resentenced for the
same offense, a court must credit fully the time that the defendant already has
served against the length of any new sentence.197
The double jeopardy clause does not fully insulate defendants from punish-
ment that may be incommensurate with their level of culpability. 198 Assuming
that the legislature's ability to effectively punish and deter is at least partly con-
tingent on its authority to prescribe more than one statutory violation for the
same act, a defendant's interest in avoiding multiple violations for the same act
and thus excessive punishment clashes with society's interest in punishment and
deterrence. The Supreme Court has handled this policy clash merely by
preventing courts from punishing defendants more severely than was intended
by the legislature. 199 By prescribing several overlapping statutory offenses, the
legislature, therefore, can enable the government to prosecute defendants under
more than one statutory provision for the same act, thereby subjecting them to
multiple punishments, provided that the punishments result from the same trial
and that the legislature intended such an outcome.20° This recent, restrictive
interpretation of the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause reflects
an emphasis on society's interest in punishment and deterrence and arguably
allows the government to subject insiders who violate lOb-5 to both the treble
penalty and the lOb-5 criminal sanctions, provided that these punishments are
issued in one trial and are consistent with the legislative intent.201
C. The Same Offense Requirement
To invoke the protections of the double jeopardy clause, a defendant must
194. Id. at 637.
195. Id. at 639; see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).
196. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 52
(1969); Note, supra note 186, at 637.
197. Note, supra note 186, at 636; see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969)
(crediting prison term served after initial trial against sentence imposed in second trial); Culp v.
Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (crediting prison sentence for time spent in pretrial
confinement).
198. See J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 40.
199. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); see People v. Moore, 143 Cal. App. 2d 333,
299 P.2d 691 (1956); J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 40.
200. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1983); Note, supra note 192, at 1000.
201. Dicta in Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), indicates that the double jeopardy
clause at one time precluded imposition of multiple sentences in a single trial. Id. at 170; see Note,
supra note 192, at 1003. As late as 1969, the Supreme Court stated that the double jeopardy clause
"protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,... against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, . . . [and] against multiple punishment for the
same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359 (1983), restricts this notion of the scope of the double jeopardy clause by removing a defendant's
protection from multiple punishments for the same offense within the same trial. Id. at 368-69.
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demonstrate that a lOb-5 criminal violation is the "same offense" as a lOb-5 civil
violation. 20 2 The test for determining whether two statutory provisions consti-
tute the same offense "is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not"20 3-the "same evidence test."'2° 4 Conspiracy to import ma-
rijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, for example, are different of-
fenses because each requires proof of a criminal element that the other does
not.20 5 In contrast, lesser-included offenses of a primary offense do not require
proof of an additional criminal element and are deemed to be the "same offense"
as the primary offense.2 0 6 Manslaughter, for example, is a lesser-included of-
fense of murder; as a result, acquittal or conviction of murder bars a retrial for
manslaughter.20 7 The same evidence test has been expanded to include greater-
included offenses. An acquittal or conviction for manslaughter, therefore,
should bar a retrial for murder.2 08 Conceptually, greater and lesser-included
offenses merge with the primary offense, thereby becoming the "same
offense."2 0 9
A lOb-5 criminal violation is clearly the same offense as a lOb-5 civil viola-
tion. Fraudulent conduct in connection with the use of material, nonpublic in-
formation and a breach of fiduciary duty are necessary elements of both a
criminal and civil lOb-5 violation.2 10 The only distinction is the requisite levels
of awareness: criminal sanctions are imposed for "willful" violations, whereas
the civil treble penalty is imposed upon a showing of scienter. 211 A willful viola-
tion entails a showing of "knowingly wrongful misconduct";2 12 scienter, in
contrast, has been interpreted to include "recklessness. ' 2 13 Thus, willfulness
connotes a higher degree of awareness and culpability; a showing of willfulness
necessarily proves scienter. Accordingly, a civil lOb-5 violation is a lesser-in-
cluded offense of a criminal lOb-5 violation, and a lOb-5 criminal violation is a
greater-included offense of a civil lOb-5 violation. Using the same evidence test,
criminal sanctions and the civil treble penalty, therefore, would be the "same
offense."
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (reprinted supra note 184).
203. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359, 366 (1983); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 66;
Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 527-34 (1949).
204. . SIGLER, supra note 185, at 66; Kirchheimer, supra note 203, at 527.
205. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 339 (1981).
206. J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 66; see eg., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980)
(rape found to be a lesser-included offense of murder committed "in the course of the rape"); Brown
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (joyriding a lesser-included offense of auto theft); Note, supra note
192, at 1008 n.53; see also Kirchheimer, supra note 203, at 528 ("[O]nly if the purpose of the second
indictment could have been reached under the first indictment would double jeopardy attach.").
207. J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 66.
208. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (greater offense of auto theft same offense as
the lesser-included offense of joyriding for double jeopardy purposes).
209. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (5th ed. 1979).
210. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
212. United States v. Chiarella, 688 F.2d 1358, 1371 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
213. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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D. Requirement that the Treble Penalty Be "Essentially Criminal"
1. The Remedial/Punitive Test
To claim double jeopardy, a defendant must establish that both a civil
treble penalty action and a criminal prosecution put a defendant in "jeop-
ardy."' 2 14 Jeopardy refers to the risks that traditionally arise from a criminal
prosecution.215 Labelling a suit "civil," however, is insufficient to deny applica-
tion of the double jeopardy clause.2 16 The test is whether the proceeding is "es-
sentially criminal. '2 17 Courts have been reluctant to categorize civil actions as
essentially criminal.218 In deciding whether an action is essentially criminal, the
primary consideration is whether the legislature intended the provision to be
punitive or remedial.2 19
Historically, only the most severe punishments provided a defendant the
protection of the double jeopardy clause.220 Today, courts do not require that a
defendant literally be twice in jeopardy of "life or limb. '221 When the potential
consequences of a sanction include a criminal stigma and the deprivation of lib-
erty or property, the proceeding may be sufficiently punitive to trigger the
double jeopardy clause.222 Fines and money penalties have been held to be puni-
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (reprinted supra note 184).
215. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 548-49 (1943).
216. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975).
217. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
218. See, eg., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1972) (civil
proceeding to forfeit undeclared imports that occurred after defendant's criminal acquittal on smug-
gling charge remedial in nature and hence not barred by double jeopardy clause); Rex Trailer Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 148, 148-52 (1956) (circuit prosecution following nolo contendere plea in
criminal action not double jeopardy); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545-46
(1943) (civil prosecution following nolo contendere plea in criminal action not double jeopardy);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402-04 (1937) (acquittal of tax evasion charge does not bar
imposition of "remedial sanction" of one-half the unpaid tax); United States v. Naftalin, 606 F.2d
809 (8th Cir. 1979) (criminal conviction for scheme to defraud in violation of Securities Act of 1933
not double jeopardy despite prior disciplinary action by SEC); United States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160,
1162-63 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978) (civil forfeiture procedure under TariffAct
would not preclude subsequent criminal prosecution because protection of double jeopardy clause
only triggered by multiple criminal punishments). But see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-31
(1974) (label of "civil" on a juvenile court proceeding insufficient to prevent application of the
double jeopardy clause in a subsequent criminal prosecution); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S.
568, 575-76 (1931) (civil penalty under National Prohibition Act disallowed following a criminal
prosecution for the same offense).
219. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1938); United States v. Ben Grunstein &
Sons, Co., 127 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D.N.J. 1955); J. SIOLER, supra note 185, at 60; Note, White-Collar
Crime" Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRim. L. REv. 173, 231 (1981). A remedial action is
one "which is brought to obtain compensation or indemnity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162
(5th ed. 1979). A punitive action, in contrast, has "the character of punishment or penalty." Id. at
1110.
220. J. SIGLER, supra note 185, at 5, 39.
221. Id. at 39; see Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169-75 (1873) (threat of death or
mutilation eliminated as requirement of double jeopardy); Note, supra note 186, at 641.
222. Note, supra note 186, at 649; see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (juvenile is put injeopardy if possible consequences of proceeding include stigma and loss of liberty for many years);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 n.12 (1969) (recognizing imprisonment and fines as
criminal punishments for double jeopardy purposes).
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tive for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause.223 On the other hand, com-
pensatory damages,22 4 injunctions,2 2 5 revocations of licenses voluntarily
granted,2 26 and forfeitures227 have been viewed as remedial.
Although a fine issued in a criminal prosecution will be characterized as
punitive, a penalty of the same severity issued in a government civil action usu-
ally is characterized as remedial. 228 In government civil actions, damages
clearly in excess of actual damages, for example, have been found to be reme-
dial.22 9 The courts have based these decisions on legislative intent to classify
civil penalties as nonpunitive sanctions. 230 Three rationales are used to support
a court's conclusion that a legislature intended a civil penalty to be viewed as
nonpunitive. First, criminal punishments are intended "to vindicate public jus-
tice,"12 31 whereas civil penalties are intended only to vindicate private justice.232
Second, by providing civil penalties, the legislature intended merely to afford
complete indemnification to the government for investigatory and other hidden
costs. 233 Last, by providing both a civil forum and procedure to adjudicate the
appropriateness of a penalty, the legislature indicated its intention to attribute
noncriminal characteristics to the penalty.2
34
In Helvering v. Mitchell,235 the Supreme Court held that a civil fifty per
cent "tax" for fraudulent tax evasion was remedial. 236 The Court reasoned that
the additional tax was intended to provide "a safeguard for the protection of
. . . revenue" and to fully indemnify the government for investigatory ex-
223. See, e-g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 345 U.S. 711, 718 n.12 (1969); United States v. La
Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931); Note, supra note 186, at 633, 641.
224. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-52 (1943).
225. Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 632 (1926); see United States v. La Franca, 282
U.S. 568, 572-73 (1931).
226. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 & n.2 (1938).
227. Id. at 400; see, eg., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-37
(1972) (civil proceeding to require forfeiture of undeclared imports after defendant's criminal acquit-
tal on smuggling charge remedial in nature).
228. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-51 (1943) (Criminal prosecu-
tion under False Claims Act resulting in $54,000 fine is "clearly criminal in nature," whereas
$315,000 in double damages and fines resulting from a civil action against the same defendant is
remedial.).
229. See, eg., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153-54 (1956) ($10,000 in penalties
for violations of the Surplus Property Act held not to be a criminal penalty); United States ax rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540, 549 (1943) ("We cannot say that [$315,000 in double damages
and fines] will do no more than afford the government complete indemnity for the injuries done it.").
230. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938); Note, supra note 186, at 642; see also
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943) ("question is one of statutory con-
struction in determining whether statute imposes a criminal sanction").
231. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)); see Comment, Punitive Damages and Double Jeopardy: A Citical Perspec-
tive of the Taber Rule, 56 IND. L.J. 71, 86 (1980).
232. Comment, supra note 231, at 86; see United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
548-50 (1943); see also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956) (emphasizing that
government contract rights and remedies are the same as those of private persons).
233. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
234. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 (1938).
235. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
236. Id. at 401.
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penses.237 The tax was viewed "as [a] civil [incident] of the assessment and
collection of the income tax."' 238 In discussing legislative intent, the Court em-
phasized that Congress had provided a civil procedure for the collection of the
tax and, therefore, "intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction.123 9
When the assessment of a civil penalty arises from fraudulent conduct in
the creation or performance of government contracts, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the penalties are intended to indemnify the government and are
not punitive. Thus, a $2,000 penalty for each violation of the antifraud provi-
sion of the Surplus Property Act of 1944240 was not viewed as "so unreasonable
or excessive that it transformed what was clearly a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty." 24 1 Analogizing the penalty to a liquidated damages clause, the
Supreme Court stated that the penalty was merely the equivalent of a recovery
in a private contract action.242
To avoid application of the double jeopardy clause in the civil setting, the
Supreme Court has expanded the concept of remedial beyond its literal meaning.
A literal application of the remedial/punitive test would render all civil penalties
in excess of actual injury or losses punitive penalties. Applying such a literal
definition, the Supreme Court in United States v. La Franca243 held a double tax
on the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor under the National Prohibition
Act24 4 to be punitive and dispelled the fiction of calling the assessment of a
double tax a "tax":
A tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of govern-
ment; a penalty. . . is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment
for an unlawful act. . . .No mere exercise of the art of lexicography
can alter the essential nature of an act or thing; and if an exaction be
clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedi-
ent of calling it such.2 45
The Court explained that "remedial" connoted a preventive sanction, such as an
237. Id.
238. Id. at 405.
239. Id. at 402.
240. Surplus Property Act of 1944, ch. 479, § 26, 58 Stat. 765, 780-81, repealed by Act of June
30, 1949, ch. 209, § 602(a)(1), 63 Stat. 399.
241. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
242. Id. at 151, 153; see also Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850) (United
States capable of making contracts).
The same reasoning was used in a government civil action under the False Claim Act of 1863,
ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982)), in which defendant, after paying a$54,000 criminal fine, was held liable for double damages and fines totaling $315,000. United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540, 545 (1943). The Court decided that the $54,000 criminal
fine was "not intended to compensate the government" because it was "clearly criminal in nature."
Id. at 548. The $315,000 civil penalty, however, was viewed as remedial-brought to protect the
government from financial loss, id. at 548-49,-as opposed to an action intended to vindicate public
justice. The court even stated that it was within Congress' power to provide the government a treble
damages remedy in such actions. Id. at 550.
243. 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
244. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and
Enforcement Act, ch. 740, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
245. La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572.
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injunction to abate a nuisance.246 In refusing to impose civil liability, the Court
emphasized that the defendant had already undergone a criminal prosecution;247
thus, a retrial, even in a civil proceeding,248 was barred by the double jeopardy
clause.249 Despite the persuasiveness of this literal approach to the remedial/
punitive test, the Supreme Court has largely ignored La Franca and instead has
adopted a more relaxed definition of remedial.
Four policy reasons explain the judiciary's reluctance to extend the double
jeopardy clause across the civil/criminal jurisdiction line. First, if courts la-
belled a civil penalty or a double tax as punitive, they implicitly would concede
that the civil courts are an appropriate forum in which to mete out criminal
punishment. Congress, however, does not have the authority to punish crimi-
nally in a civil proceeding;250 if it did have this authority, the protection afforded
a defendant in a criminal forum, such as requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could be easily circumvented. Thus, to maintain an appearance of ration-
ality in the issuance of punishment, the courts are apt to label sanctions available
in a civil proceeding as "civil" or "remedial." Second, to label a civil sanction as
punitive would threaten the government's ability to prosecute criminals; once
jeopardy attached to a civil action, a criminal prosecution against the same de-
fendant for the same offense would be barred. Third, if any two statutory provi-
sions exposed a defendant to double prosecution for the same offense and,
consequently, were deemed to violate the double jeopardy clause, a court would
be forced to determine whether these statutes were unconstitutional.251 In turn,
this could lead to a time-consuming overhaul of many state statutes. Fourth,
Congress' ability to deter socially detrimental conduct may be contingent on its
ability to provide civil penalties. For example, the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt renders criminal law punishments ineffective in cases against
insiders who violate lOb-5 because such cases are based almost exclusively on
circumstantial evidence.252 Because the burden of proof is less onerous in civil
proceedings, civil sanctions provide the enforcement device needed to bolster
deterrence. Labelling civil sanctions as punitive, however, eliminates this means
of achieving deterrence because the double jeopardy clause would limit the gov-
ernment to either a civil or a criminal action. These policy considerations have
encouraged courts to pay lip service to legislative intent while concluding that a
clearly punitive provision is remedial.
246. Id. at 573.
247. Id.
248. The Court stated that "the word 'prosecution' is not inapt to describe" such a civil action.
Id. at 575.
249. Id. at 574.
250. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 402 n.6.
251. See, ag., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978). In Simpson the defendant was
charged under the Federal Bank Robbery Act and felony firearms statute. Id. at 9. The Court
avoided constitutional analysis of statutes by applying a "rule of lenity" and by interpreting legisla-
tive ambiguity in defendant's favor. Id. at 15; see also La Franca, 282 U.S. at 574-75 (Court consid-
ered whether the potential for double jeopardy created by the Willis-Campbell Act and the National
Prohibition Act undermined the validity of the two statutes).
252. See supra note 46.
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2. Application of the Remedial/Punitive Test to the Treble Penalty
Even under the current interpretation of the remedial/punitive test, courts
would find it difficult to categorize the SEC treble penalty as remedial. The
treble penalty has all the characteristics of a criminal punishment and virtually
none of the characteristics of the civil penalties that courts have classified as
remedial. The treble penalty was not designed to vindicate private justice; in-
stead, the treble penalty, as evidenced by ITSA's legislative history, was
designed to effect the criminal law goals of punishment and deterrence and to
protect investor confidence and the integrity of the capital markets. 253 The leg-
islative history of ITSA clearly indicates that Congress was attempting to re-
solve the broad societal problem of insider trading.254 The penalty is paid not to
the injured investors, but to the United States Treasury,2 55 indicating that the
action is brought on behalf of the public as a whole.
Unlike government tax and contract actions seeking civil penalties, the
treble penalty is not intended to indemnify the government. When the govern-
ment seeks to penalize a defendant for tax evasion or for fraudulent conduct in
contracting with the government, the government can be likened to a private
party having a monetary stake in the defendant's assets.25 6 Private parties may
be entitled to punitive damages or damages in excess of actual damages as a
result of a liquidated damages clause.2 57 The government is entitled to similar
remedies. 258 When the government sues to collect a tax or to enforce a contract,
a penalty in excess of the actual claim is similar to a private recovery,
259
designed to reimburse the government for expenses incident to the investigation
and collection of the amount owed.26° The treble penalty, in contrast, is not
attached to a prior government monetary claim against the defendant. The gov-
ernment suffers no specific monetary losses from the insider's conduct. It would
be unreasonable, therefore, to view the treble penalty as indemnifying the
government.
The inaccuracy of labelling the treble penalty as remedial also is apparent
from a comparison of the treble penalty and the injunctive sanction. An injunc-
tion squarely meets the definition of remedial because it is designed to prevent a
253. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text. "The broad point is that the public policy
goal we are after is to achieve fairness in the market place. . . ." House Hearings, supra note 5, at
35-36 (statement of Rep. Wirth).
255. See supra note 60.
256. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-51 (1943); see also Rex Trailer
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956) (government recovery of $10,000 penalty comparable
to private parties' recovery under a liquidated damage clause).
257. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943).
258. Id. at 549-50.
259. Id. at 550 (The government, "when spending its money has the same interest in protecting
itself from fraudulent practices as it has in protecting any citizen from frauds which may be prac-
ticed upon him.").
260. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401 ("[S]anctions imposing additions to a tax... are provided pri-
marily as safeguard. . . of the revenue. . .[and] to reimburse the Government for heavy expenses
of investigation.").
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second violation by the defendant.26 ' However, because an injunction does not
deter an initial violation, Congress believed it to be an inadequate sanction.
2 62
Representative Wirth asserted that pre-ITSA sanctions "merely [restore] an un-
scrupulous trader to his original position without extracting a real penalty for
his illegal behavior." 263 The treble penalty stands in stark contrast to the in-
junctive sanction, representing Congress' effort to provide a "real penalty. ' '2 6
More importantly, Congress did not intend the treble penalty to be reme-
dial.265 In applying the remedial/punitive test, courts purportedly look to legis-
lative intent.2 66 However, it is difficult to accurately discern the legislature's
intention in creating a sanction.267 Not all sanctions available in the civil or
criminal arenas are sufficiently punitive to trigger the double jeopardy clause;268
only sanctions that are intended to effect the traditional purposes of the criminal
law are deemed sufficient.2 69 The courts and commentators are divided on the
question of whether sanctions instituted to rehabilitate defendants are "essen-
tially criminal." 270 Sanctions designed for punishment and deterrence, however,
clearly are criminal in nature.27 1 Congress devised the treble penalty to deter
insider trading and to punish violators, something Congress felt the pre-ITSA
sanctions could not do adequately.272 Thus, the underlying purposes of the
treble penalty are identical to the purposes typically associated with criminal
punishments.
The enacted and proposed limitations on application of the treble penalty
further indicate Congress' recognition of the punitive nature of the treble pen-
alty. Enacted limitations include a statute of limitations, prohibition of respon-
deat superior, restrictions on liability for aiding and abetting, and conferal on
the trial court of discretion not to issue the full treble penalty. 273 In addition,
Congress enacted a defendant-favorable restrictive formula for calculating the
base figure used to determine a defendant's total liability.274 A proposal that
would have heightened the standard of proof required to impose the treble pen-
alty was strongly considered but ultimately rejected.275
Comments made during the legislative process also reflect an awareness of
the treble penalty's punitive nature. John Fedders, former head of SEC enforce-
261. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
263. 130 CONG. REc. H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth); see supra note
57.
264. See 130 CONG. REc. H7757, H7759 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
265. See id.
266. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
267. Note, supra note 186, at 646.
268. Id. at 640 n.32.
269. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 186, at 646-47.
270. Note, supra note 186, at 647.
271. See id. at 646 nn.61-62.
272. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
273. For discussion of and citations to the enacted and proposed limitations, see supra notes 68-
80 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 80.
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ment, described the treble penalty as an "extraordinary burden. ' 276 One par-
ticipant stated that "since the penalty may exceed the inside trader's actual or
theoretical gain (or avoidance of loss), the penalty takes on significance as a
quasi-criminal punishment. '277 Representative Rinaldo asked whether "a
higher burden of proof, such as proof by clear and convincing evidence, [should]
be applied in the special circumstances of treble damages actions under [ITSA]
in light of the potentially severe penalties." 278 Furthermore, in discussing
whether a definition of "insider trading" should accompany ITSA, Rinaldo
stated that "when you go from the remedial stage to the punitive stage,. . there
should be a definition, but that definition should apply only to... the [treble
penalty]." 279 Along with the enacted and proposed limitations on the applica-
bility" of the treble penalty and the sanction's criminal law purposes, these com-
ments clearly demonstrate that the treble penalty was intended as a punitive
sanction.
3. Comparison of the Treble Penalty With Punitive Damages
Punitive damages "consist of an additional sum, over and above the com-
pensation of the plaintiff for the harm which he has suffered, which are awarded
to him for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of admonishing him not to do
it again, and of deterring others from following his example. '2 80 The treble
penalty fits this definition, with the exception that it is paid to the government
instead of to a private plaintiff.2 81 First, as with punitive damages, the treble
penalty is aimed at deterrence. Second, as with a payment in excess of compen-
satory damages, any payment in excess of an amount already disgorged would
be punitive. In other words, a defendant, after disgorging profits, is returned to
his or her financial position prior to the illicit transaction.28 2 A payment of
three times that amount must be viewed as punitive. That the treble penalty is
analogous to punitive damages suggests that it is punitive for the purposes of the
double jeopardy clause.
The majority of courts, however, will award punitive damages even though
the defendant has been prosecuted criminally for the same act.28 3 Treble dam-
ages awarded to private plaintiffs under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)284 and the Clayton Act, 285 for example, will not bar
276. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 63.
277. Id. at 121.
278. Id. at 39.
279. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
280. W. PROSSER & . WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1076 (1971).
281. See supra note 60.
282. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
283. See W. PROSSER & J. WADE, supra note 280, at 1076.
284. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976); Note, Use of Collateral Estoppel in Private Civil Actions Under
RICO: The Procedural Benefits of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 52 U. Cn. L. REv. 490, 490(1983); see also Note, supra note 219, at 230 ("[Ihe provision for both criminal and civil sanctions
under the same act does not constitute double jeopardy.").
285. Herald Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125, 129-30 (8th Cir. 1969); Comment, supra note 231, at
79, 92; see also Note, supra note 219, at 230 ("[T"he provision for both criminal and civil sanctions
under the same act does not constitute double jeopardy.").
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a subsequent criminal prosecution. At first glance, this would support the view
that the double jeopardy clause should not apply to the treble penalty. Because
the government in a civil action is entitled to the rights and remedies of a private
plaintiff,28 6 a private plaintiff's authority to seek punitive damages without the
risk of a double jeopardy defense should allow the government to sidestep the
double jeopardy clause when bringing a civil treble penalty action. This argu-
ment, however, is not convincing.
Some states do not permit punitive damages, believing that only the govern-
ment has the authority to punish a defendant. 28 7 Thus, because -they view puni-
tive damages as a criminal punishment, the treble penalty, at least in these states,
will be considered a criminal punishment. Consistent with this view, other
states have suggested that punitive damages should be paid to the state's treas-
ury2 8 8-another indication that punitive damages constitute criminal punish-
ment. Indiana, for example, rejects punitive damages when the defendant is
subject to a criminal prosecution for the same act.28 9 The rationale for this view
is that the spirit of the double jeopardy clause should protect a defendant from
double punishment, regardless of whether one source of the punishment is con-
tained within a private civil action.290 In recognizing that the combination of a
private punitive damages action and a criminal prosecution would constitute
two "essentially criminal" actions against a defendant for the same offense, Indi-
ana's treatment of punitive damages supports the argument that a defendant
should be protected from the combination of a treble penalty and a criminal
prosecution. Thus, the government can not rely on the analogy between puni-
tive damages and the treble penalty to argue that a combination of a treble pen-
alty action and a criminal prosecution should be outside the scope of the double
jeopardy clause.
Even in jurisdictions allowing punitive damages in a criminal prosecution,
the analogy between punitive damages and the treble penalty does not compel
the conclusion that the treble penalty should be outside the scope of the double
jeopardy clause. Although similar in many respects, the treble penalty and puni-
tive damages are distinguishable. One difference is that some statutorily author-
ized forms of punitive damages, such as treble damages under RICO and the
Clayton Act, have a remedial purpose. By increasing the percentage of injured
persons who are ultimately recompensed, treble damages serve a remedial pur-
pose.29 1 This distinguishes treble damages from criminal sanctions and arguably
286. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
287. W. PROSSER & 1. WADE, supra note 280, at 1076.
288. Id. at 1077.
289. Wabash Printing & Publishing Co. v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89, 21 N.E. 904 (1889); Taber v.
Hutson, 5 Ind. 332 (1854); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456 (1973); W. PRossER &
. WADE, supra note 280, at 1076; Comment, supra note 231, at 72.
290. Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 332, 335-36 (1854); Comment, supra note 231, at 73.
291. Although the treble penalty provides private plaintiffs an incentive to litigate and thus pro-
motes deterrence, Congress also intended to effect redress for injuries suffered. See Note, Section 5(a)
and the Use of Collateral Estoppel, supra note 174, at 74; see also W. PROSSER & . WADE, supra
note 280, at 1077 (One justification for punitive damages is to provide "an incentive to bring into
court and redress a long array of petty cases of outrage and oppression.. . which a private individ-
ual would otherwise find not worth the trouble and expense of a lawsuit.").
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justifies insulating treble damages in RICO and Clayton Act cases from the
reach of the double jeopardy clause.
The ITSA treble penalty, in contrast, is not designed to encourage private
actions. Instead, the penalty is sought by and paid to the government and there-
fore will not increase the percentage of recompensed, injured investors. Accord-
ingly, unlike RICO and Clayton Act treble damages, the ITSA treble penalty
has no remedial purpose that would justify removing it from the scope of the
double jeopardy clause.
In addition, some courts, in refusing to apply the double jeopardy clause to
punitive damages, have characterized punitive damages as vindicating "the in-
terests of an individual who has been the victim of a malicious wrong." 292 This
characterization distinguishes punitive damages from criminal punishments that
are designed to vindicate public justice.293 Arguably, the government also is
vindicating private justice when it sues to rectify an isolated occurrence, such as
a breach of a government contract. In these situations, awarding the govern-
ment punitive damages, without the attachment of "jeopardy" to the action,
may be appropriate because the government can be viewed as any other injured
plaintiff. In bringing the ITSA treble penalty action, however, the government
is not redressing a personal, isolated grievance with a defendant; rather, the gov-
ernment is attempting to effect the criminal law purposes of deterrence and pun-
ishment. Thus, the treble penalty falls within the scope of the double jeopardy
clause.
4. Policy Considerations
Despite the policy reasons behind classifying sanctions issued in civil courts
as remedial, the legislative intent approach to the remedial/punitive test would
lose any sense of rationality if courts attributed a remedial purpose to a sanction
so clearly punitive as the treble penalty. Congress should not be able to change
the nature of a sanction merely by shifting the sanction into the civil forum. In
fact, the argument for protecting an individual is stronger when one of two puni-
tive actions is initiated in a civil forum because a defendant loses the protections
afforded by the criminal procedures. For example, the government need only
prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence to prevail in a civil enforce-
ment action. Thus, rationality, fairness, and constitutional considerations dic-
tate that Congress not infringe on a citizen's criminal procedure rights and
double jeopardy protections merely by transferring a criminal penalty to a civil
forum.
The purposes of the double jeopardy clause also favor its application follow-
ing either a civil treble penalty action or a lOb-5 criminal prosecution. The pri-
mary purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to provide a defendant with
finality in the litigation of essentially criminal prosecutions. Because insiders are
currently subject to the full barrage of SEC enforcement sanctions, a criminal
292. Comment, supra note 231, at 86.
293. Id. at 85-86.
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prosecution, and private actions, they have an acute interest in resolving any
risks of punishment in one prosecution. In recognition of this interest, punitive
damages are disallowed in private actions against insiders.294
The second purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to prevent punishment
that is incommensurate with a defendant's level of culpability. Under ITSA, an
insider who violates lOb-5 is subject to an injunction, disgorgement, a treble
penalty, a $100,000 criminal penalty, imprisonment, and payment of compensa-
tory damages in private actions.2 95 The combined effect of these measures is
disproportionate to the insider's level of culpability. John Fedders, former head
of SEC enforcement, predicted a decline in criminal prosecutions with the ad-
vent of the treble penalty.296 Fedders predicted that once a defendant has dis-
gorged illicit profits, paid an additional treble penalty, and received an
injunction prohibiting future violations the Department of Justice would decline
the opportunity to pursue further sanctions.297
In calculating the amount of the treble penalty, courts have the authority to
triple "the difference between the purchase or sale price of the security and the
trading price of that security a reasonable period after public dissemination of
the nonpublic information." 298 This base figure from which the treble penalty is
calculated has only a tenuous connection with a defendant's level of culpability;
yet, it has a substantial effect on the amount of the penalty. The magnitude of
the base figure depends far more on fortuitous fluctuations in the market price of
the stock than on the defendant's level of culpability. . Two defendants, both
knowingly trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information and breaching
a fiduciary duty, may wind up with great differences in their respective liabilities.
In addition, an insider's base figure could be astronomical if the release of the
inside information results in a substantial change in the price of the stock. By
basing a defendant's liability in part on shifts in the securities market, Congress
has created the potential for harsh and unjust results. Because of this, the appli-
cation of the double jeopardy clause to prevent the addition of criminal fines and
imprisonment to the already harsh treble penalty is consistent with the clause's
purpose of protecting a defendant from disproportionate punishment.
5. Criticism of the Legislative Intent Approach
Although the courts are reluctant to extend the double jeopardy clause
across the civil/criminal jurisdictional line,299 the legislative intent approach to
the remedial/punitive test nevertheless results in a classification of the treble
penalty as punitive. The courts look to legislative intent to decide whether a
civil sanction is remedial or punitive. 3°° This approach emphasizes society's in-
294. See T. HAzEN, supra note 3, at 471.
295. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
296. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 70-71.
297. Id.
298. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (d)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1985); House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 91; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 29.
299. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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terest in effecting punishment and deterrence while circumventing the double
jeopardy clause by imputing a remedial purpose to a punitive sanction.30 1 The
legislative intent approach also ignores the effect a sanction has on a defend-
ant.30 2 Regardless of legislative intent, a penalty in excess of compensatory
damages is punitive.30 3 A court cannot change the objective nature of a sanction
merely by imputing a remedial purpose to it.3 ° 4 One student commentator has
recommended that the courts look instead to the effect a sanction has on the
defendant in determining whether the sanction is punitive or remedial.305
Clearly, the treble penalty would be viewed as punitive under this effects
approach.
The effects approach, however, ignores the policy reasons behind the legis-
lative intent approach. If every civil penalty, regardless of amount, was viewed
as sufficient to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense, the
government's ability to effect deterrence and punishment would be undermined.
For example, civil penalties for tax fraud would bar a subsequent criminal prose-
cution.30 6 Particularly when the civil penalty is mild, the government's interest
in law enforcement must outweigh a defendant's interest in avoiding the second
of two punitive actions. In balancing these competing interests, a court should
assess whether the civil punishment is sufficiently severe to warrant the protec-
tion of the double jeopardy clause. In this way, courts could avoid both the
inquiry into legislative intent and the contrived definition of remedial. This ap-
proach is justified on the principle that the double jeopardy clause is applicable
only to serious punishments.3° 7 If a penalty were deemed severe enough to war-
rant the protection of the double jeopardy clause, the legislature would not be
able to modify this determination by making the penalty available in a civil fo-
rum. Thus, a defendant would not be subject to double prosecution merely be-
cause of a change in forum. Under this proposed approach, ITSA's treble
penalty would be considered severe enough to warrant granting the defendant
the protection of the double jeopardy clause.
E. Legislative Recommendations
Based on the foregoing assessment of the double jeopardy clause, a defend-
ant should be protected from the second of the two punitive government lOb-5
actions. To avoid losing the combined effect of the treble penalty and the crimi-
nal sanctions, Congress should add the treble penalty to the criminal sanctions.
Because the double jeopardy clause has been construed to limit double prosecu-
301. See supra note 229.
302. See Note, supra note 186, at 648 & n.67.
303. La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572; see also W. PROSSER & J. WADE, supra note 280, at 1076
(definition of "punitive damages" being the amount of damages in excess of compensation for harm
caused.).
304. See La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572.
305. Note, supra note 186, at 648-50.
306. Id. at 645 n.58.
307. Although the threat of death or mutilation has been removed as a necessary element of
double jeopardy, courts can rely on this historical application of the double jeopardy clause to hold
penalties slightly in excess of actual damages as falling short of the clause's intended reaches.
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tion but not multiple punishment within one trial,30 8 adding the treble penalty
to the available criminal sanctions would enable the government to seek both in
one trial. The government would have the option of seeking either the civil
treble penalty alone or the criminal treble penalty, imprisonment, and $100,000
fine. Additionally, the civil treble penalty would be available in the event the
government determined that it could not prevail in a criminal prosecution due to
the circumstantial nature of the evidence, the requirement of showing a willful
violation, or the criminal burden of proof. Thus, insider trading could be de-
terred without violating the double jeopardy clause. Furthermore, the total pun-
ishment to which a defendant would be exposed would be contingent on the
level of culpability. A defendant committing willful violations would be subject
to the same total punishment as he or she would be if the government were
allowed to bring both a civil treble penalty action and a criminal prosecution.
F. Summary of Double Jeopardy
The double jeopardy clause should protect an insider from the combination
of an SEC treble penalty action and a criminal prosecution. The treble penalty
action and the lOb-5 criminal prosecution both seek to administer essentially
criminal punishments against an insider for the same offense, triggering the
double jeopardy clause. The treble penalty is sufficiently punitive to constitute
criminal punishment. Furthermore, the treble penalty was designed by Con-
gress to serve the criminal law purposes of deterrence and punishment.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a general rule, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will enable a plaintiff in
a private action to preclude an SEC defendant from relitigating issues previously
adjudicated in an SEC treble penalty action. Collateral estoppel, however,
should not be applied indiscriminately. An SEC defendant faces the procedural
disadvantages not only of confronting the resources of the SEC, but also of los-
ing the right to a jury trial in a subsequent private action. Therefore, before
applying collateral estoppel, a judge in a private action should ascertain the ex-
tent to which an SEC defendant has encountered other procedural disadvan-
tages. When in doubt, the judge should deny collateral estoppel, particularly
when the SEC treble penalty action ended with a compromise verdict.
The double jeopardy clause will protect an insider from the combination of
an SEC treble penalty action and a criminal prosecution. To avoid losing the
combined effect of the treble penalty and the criminal sanctions, Congress
should add the treble penalty to the current criminal sanctions.
JONATHAN A. BLUMBERG
308. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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